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THE MASSACHUSETTS CHILD CUSTODY
STANDARD: A NEED FOR REFORM
In the United States, it is generally assumed that children are best reared in a family
setting, especially the family setting into which they are born.' Our laws thus grant
parents broad freedom in deciding how to raise their children. 2 In general, the parent-
child relationship is free from state regulation.3 The state is not, however, powerless to
intervene in the parent-child relationship: intervention can and does occur when the
child's welfare is threatened by inadequate parenting. 4
The state has traditionally justified this intervention in the parent-child relationship
under the doctrine of parens patriae. 5 This doctrine, which is said to be derived from an
English royal prerogative, involves the notion of the state as a substitute parent when
the safety or welfare of a child is threatened.° This conception of the state intervening
in the parent-child relationship to protect a child's safety remains the primary justification
for state involvement in child-custody cases.'
S. KATZ, WHEN PARENTS FAIL 1 (1971).
2 Wald, Slate Intervention on Behalf of "Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic. Standards, 27
STAN. L. REV. 985, 989 (1975).
3 One commentator has even suggested that the parent-child relationship is constitutionally
protected as a fundamental right. Note, The Right to Family Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Approach
to State Removal and Termination Proceedings, 68 GEo. L.J. 213, 240 (1979). While the United States
Supreme Court has protected certain family rights as fundamental, the Court has never explicitly
applied the fundamental right analysis to the parent-child relationship.
4 See, e.g., Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944). The Su-
preme Court has stated that "the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest „
[a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation." Id. at 166.
See Note, The l'arens Patriae Theory and Its Effect on the Constitutional Limits of Juvenile Court
Powers, 27 U. Prrr. L. REv, 894, 894 (1966); S. KATZ., supra note I, at 4; Wald, supra note 2, at 989.
The term is literally defined as parent of the country. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
6 Note, supra note 5, at 894. The King of England was, in theory, the "father" of his country,
whose duty it was to defend "his" children when their safety or welfare was threatened. Id. That
duty applied particularly to those of his subjects who could not protect themselves, including
children. S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 17 n.17. The English case of Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 2 P. Wms. 103,
24 Eng. Rep. 659 (1722), is generally regarded as the first judicial recognitions of the validity of the
doctrine. S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 17 n.17. The Court of Chancery, in deciding a guardianship
question concerning the Earl of Shaftesbury, declared that "every loyal subject is taken to be within
the King's protection, for which reason it is, that idiots and lunatics, who are unable to take care
of themselves, are provided for by the King as pater patriae, and there is the same reason to extend
this care to infants." Eyre v. Shaftesbury, 2 P. Wms. at 118, 24 Eng. Rep. at 664.
7 Note, supra note 5, at 897. Massachusetts' legislature has explicitly recognized the use of the
parens patriae doctrine to protect the children of the Commonwealth. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119,
§ 1 (Michie/Law. Co -op. 1975). See also Note, King Solomon's Court: Reconciling the Interests of Parent,
Child and State Under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 119, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 853, 856-57 (1980). Section 1
of chapter 119 provides that substitute care is to be provided for children whose parents are
temporarily or permanently unable to provide "care and protection for their children." MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975). Chapter 119 thus provides broad authorization for
the courts to intervene in the parent-child relationship when a child's welfare is threatened. See id.
§§ 1, 24 and 26. See also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (acting
to "guard the general interest in youth's well being," state, may, as parens patriae, restrict parents'
control over their children in many ways).
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Tension, however, often has arisen between the state's duty to protect children
under its parens patriae power and biological parents' right to rear their children as they
see fit. 8 State statutes authorizing courts to intervene in the parent-child relationship
traditionally have granted the judiciary broad, general power to resolve child-custody
disputes. 9
 Statutory terms such as "neglect," "parental fitness," or "best interests of the
child" cannot be simply or rigidly defined. 1 ° These standards are subjective and are
designed to give trial judges, who are close to the family situation and knowledgeable
about the community's resources, discretion in their interpretation and application."
The legislature thus has left the courts the task of balancing the interests of the state,
the child, and the parents in deciding cases involving the temporary and permanent
severance of the parent-child relationship."
Against the background of this general statutory grant, the courts have developed
two doctrines which address the balance between the state's parens patriae duty and the
rights of biological parents in child-custody cases. These two doctrines are known as the
best interests of the child test and the parental fitness test." Under the best interests
test, courts focus primarily on the interests of the child in deciding whether a parent
may retain custody of his or her child." In contrast, under the parental fitness test, also
known as the parental right doctrine, biological parents are entitled to the custody of
their child unless they are affirmatively shown to be unfit." Under the parental fitness
standard, then, the rights of the biological parents are decisive in the disposition of
child-custody disputes.' 6
Massachusetts purports to use a "dual" standard in child-custody disputes, which
considers both the fitness of the natural parents and the best interests of the child. This
article argues, however, that the Commonwealth, in recent years, has adopted a strict
parental right approach to resolving these disputes. The Supreme judicial Court has
established a presumption that a child's interests, except in the clearest cases of parental
unfitness, are best served by the child remaining with or being returned to his or her
natural family." In accord with this presumption, the court has refused to recognize the
validity of psychological parenthood 18 and has ruled that a statutory presumption favor-
ing adoption of children who have been with their foster parents for more than one
8 See, e.g., Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944); Note, supra
note 3, at 214.
9 See S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 58-65.
Id. at 59.
" Id.
' 2 Id. at 58-65.
" Note, Alternatives to -Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE
151, 152 (1963).
14 1d. at 156.
' 5 Id. at 152-53.
' 6 See id. at 155.
17 See Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383
Mass. 573, 588-89, 421 N.E.2d 28, 36-37 (1981).
's See Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 716 n.18, 467 N.E.2d 851, 860
n.18 (1984). Psychological parenthood is the term used to describe i he process where children are
separated from their natural parents and subsequently form parental bonds with their foster
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year is unconstitutional.' 9 Massachusetts' approach to child-custody disputes contrasts
markedly with that of many other states. In these jurisdictions, recognizing a child's need
for continuity and emotional stability, courts have accepted the concept of psychological
parenthood and have established fixed time periods within which natural parents can
regain their children who have been placed with foster parents. 20
This note will trace the development of the present Massachusetts standard for
intervention in the parent-child relationship and will suggest that the Supreme Judicial
Court's use of the parental right doctrine favors parental rights at the expense of the
welfare of Massachusetts' children. It also will suggest that Massachusetts adopt a stan-
dard which makes the physical and psychological interests and welfare of the child in
custody disputes the paramount consideration of Massachusetts' courts. This note begins
by tracing the historic development and use of Massachusetts' "dual" standard for
intervention in the parent-child relationship. Against this background, the note examines
the Supreme judicial Court's present interpretation of the standard as evidenced by two
recent decisions. Next, a critique and evaluation of the Massachusetts standard, as well
as alternatives adopted by other states, is presented. In conclusion, the note advances a
proposal for legislative change in Massachusetts which is consistent with the mandate
implicit in the state's parens patriae power.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STANDARD
The parens patriae doctrine has long been employed by Massachusetts' courts to
uphold the right of the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship. In 1894, in
In re Wares, 2 ' the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the constitutionality of a child-custody
statute which allowed the state to take custody of children when their welfare or best
interests were threatened by their natural parents. 22 According to the court, the state's
intervention in the parent-child relationship was justified by its parens patriae power to
protect children." In 1943, in Commonwealth v. Prince, the court relied on the state's
authority as parens patriae to uphold the validity of Massachusetts' child-labor laws, which
regulated the employment of children by forbidding their participation in selling reli-
gious literature. 24 The court ruled that since the state is responsible for protecting the
welfare of children, the legislation was justified. 25 More recently, the court affirmed the
vitality of the parens patriae doctrine in Custody of a Minor.2" In this case, the court observed
that "the State has a long-standing interest in protecting the welfare of children living
within its borders." 27 Hence, the parens patriae doctrine has withstood constitutional
See Petition of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389
Mass. 793, 802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983).
2° For an example of such a state, see infra notes 291-301 and accompanying text.
21 la re Wares, 161 Mass. 70, 74, 36 N.E. 586, 587 (1894).
2`2
	 at 74, 36 N.E. at 587.
23 Id.
24 See Commonwealth v. Prince, 313 Mass. 223, 231, 46 N.E.2d 755, 758 (1943). This case was
considered by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court upheld the state's authority
as pareas patriae to protect the welfare of children. See Prince v. Commonwealth v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 167 (1944).
2 ' Prince, 313 Mass, at 231, 46 N.E.2d at 758.
26 Custody of a Minor, 375 Mass. 733, 379 N.E.2d 1053 (1978).
27 Id. at 754, 379 N.E.2d at 1066.
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challenge in Massachusetts and is recognized to be both vital and necessary in protecting
the welfare of children in child-custody disputes. Thus, as interpreted by the courts, the
doctrine gives the state a broad "right" to intervene in the parent-child relationship
when a child's welfare is threatened."
The practical decision as to when intervention in a particular parent-child relation-
ship is justified, however, rests mainly on legal standards formulated by the Massachusetts
state legislature. 2" In Massachusetts, the legislature has outlined the state's authority in
this area in chapter 119. 30 This statute provides that any person who has reason to
believe that a child is being neglected or is not receiving proper care can file a care and
protection petition with the juvenile Court requesting intervention in the parent-child
relationship." If the court finds that the allegations in the petition have been proved,"
the child may be committed to the custody of the Department of Social Services" (the
department) until the child is either eighteen or until, in the opinion of theThepartment,
. the object of his or her commitment has been achieved." The judge, however, is given
28 See id.
2"
	 MASS. ANN. LAU'S ch. 119, §§ 24, 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986). See also S. KATZ,
supra note 1, at 56. Professor Katz has observed that child-custody statutes provide a legal standard
which essentially incorporates the community's norm of adequate parenting by defining when
parents are inadequate to provide and care for their children. Id. at 57. Professor Katz maintains
that these statutes essentially attempt to delineate unacceptable child-rearing practices. Id. The
approach of the neglect statute is therefore negative: it defines what the state considers to be
undesirable parenting practices while leaving the "desired" approach to child-rearing to be filled in
by inference. Id.
See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
" Id. § 24. Section 29 provides in pertinent part that
[LI]pon the petition of any person alleging on behalf of a child under the age of
eighteen years within the jurisdiction of said court that said child is without: (a)
necessary and proper physical or educational care and discipline or; (b) is growing up
under conditions or circumstances damaging to the child's sound character develop-
ment or; (c) who lacks proper attention of parent, guardian with care and custody, or
custodian or; (d) whose parents, guardian or custodian are unwilling, incompetent or
unavailable to provide any such care, may issue a precept to bring such child before
said court, shall issue a notice to die department, and shall issue summonses to both
parents of the child to show cause why the child should not be committed to the
custody of the department or other appropriate order made.
Id.
32
 The court must find that the child before it is a victim of parental neglect as defined by
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 24 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Stipp. 1986). See id.
"The Department of Social Services was, prior to 1978, known as the Department of Public
Welfare. See ch. 119, § 26(2)(iii) (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986).
$4 Id. Section 26 provides in pertinent part that
[i]f the court finds the allegations in the petition proved within the meaning of this
chapter, it may adjudge that said child is in need of care and protection and may
commit the child to the custody of the department until he becomes eighteen years of
age or until in the opinion of the department the object of his commitment has been
accomplished, whichever occurs first; or make any other appropriate order with ref-
erence to the care and custody of the child as may conduce to his best interests,
induding but not limited to any one or more of the following: —
(1) It may permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian, or other custo-
dian, subject to conditions and limitations which the court may prescribe including
supervision as directed by the court for the care and protection of the child.
(2) It may, subject to such conditions and limitations as it may prescribe, transfer
temporary legal custody to any of the following: —
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broad discretion in his or her disposition of the petition. The statute authorizes the
judge to "make any other appropriate order with reference to the care and custody of
the child as may conduce to his best interests."• In general, the court is faced primarily
with the choice of leaving the child with his parents, subject to supervision by the
department,'" or transferring temporary legal custody to an individual, a licensed private
agency, or the Department of Social Services." Once a case has been decided, the court
may be petitioned every six months for a review and redetermination of the "current
needs" of the child."
A care and protection petition, if' granted, allows the state to intrude into the familial
sphere. Neglectful parents may be subject to supervision by the Department of Social
Services or may lose temporary legal custody of the child." Parents do not, however,
lose all parental rights with regard to their children under chapter 119. Transfer of
legal custody, usually to foster parents, is statutorily defined as "temporary."41' Once the
child has been removed from its natural parents, the state is required to make every
effort to reunite the family:1 '
Unlike the foster parent-child relationship, which is intended to be temporary, the
adoptive parent-child relationship is permanent and only exists if the rights of the natural
parents have been terminated:12 In general, under chapter 210, Massachusetts requires
that the natural parents give written consent to an adoption. 43 Under certain circum-
stances, however, that consent is not required." The court may dispense with the natural
parents' consent if it finds that doing so would be "in the best interests of the child."' 5
. (i) any individual who, after study by a probation officer or other person or agency
designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to give care to the child;
(ii) any agency or other private organization licensed or otherwise authorized by
law to receive and provide care for the child;
(iii) the department of social services.
(3) It may order appropriate physical care including medical or dental care.
On any petition filed in any court pursuant to this section, the department,
parents, person having legal custody of, counsel for a child, the probation officer,
guardian or guardian ad litem may petition the court not more than once every six
months for a review and redetermination of the current needs of such child whose
case has come before the court.
Id.
35 Id.
96 1d. § 26(1).
" Id. § 26(2)(i)—(iii).
" Id. § 26(3). This provision is consistent with the overall purpose of chapter 119, which is to
"provide substitute care of children only when the family itself or the resources available to the
family are unable to provide the necessary care and protection to insure the rights of any child to
sound health and normal physical, mental, spiritual and moral development." Id, § 1- The state's
first objective, however, is the "strengthening and encouragement of family life for the protection
and care of children." Id, Thus, substitute care is only to be provided after the state has attempted
to help strengthen the family and only when such help has not altered the neglect situation.
39 Id. § 26(2)—(3).
40 1d § 26(2).
" See id. § 1. See also Care and Protection of Three. Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 715, 467 N.E.2d
851, 859-60 (1984) (quoting Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 266, 381 N.E.2d 565, 573 (1978).
42 See S. KA•z, supra note 1, at 115.
See MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 210, § 2 (Michic/Law. Co-op. 1981).
44 See id. § '3.
45 See id. § 3(a)(ii).
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In considering whether the best interests of the child will be served by termination of
the parent-child relationship, the court is required to consider the fitness of the natural
parents. 16 If the parents are unfit, their consent to adoption will be waived and, in most
cases, their rights to their child will be terminated by the subsequent adoption of the
child.'" Thus, a petition under chapter 210, section 3, if allowed, will usually result in a
permanent severance of the parent-child relationship. Orice the child has been adopted,
the natural parents have lost forever any rights to that child. 45
Thus, the legal standard which the Massachusetts legislature has provided for de-
termining whether the state should intervene in the parent-child relationship considers
both the best interests of the child and the fitness of the natural parents.''`' The combi-
nation of these two standards has long been applied in Massachusetts to cases involving
the care and protection of children." The parental fitness test provides that natural
parents are entitled to custody of their child unless they are affirmatively shown to be
unfit." Historically, the parental fitness test seems to have evolved from the notion of
the child as property. 52 The disappearance of this notion and the rise of the parents patriae
doctrine have led courts to place an increasing emphasis on the welfare of the child in
custody cases." Theoretically, then, under the best interests standard, the rights of the
child are the courts' paramount consideration while, under the parental fitness test, the
46 See id. § 3(c). Section 3(c) provides in relevant part that
[i]n determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by issuing a
decree dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under paragraph (b), the
court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents .
to assume parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed by the
department or other agency initiating the petition.
Id.
47 Allowance of a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption is nue, however, Final
approval of the department's plans. Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with
Consent to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 262 n.2, 381 N.E.2d 565, 571 n.2 (1978). The actual adoption
proceeding is separately conducted under ch. 210, § 5A. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 5A (Michie/
Law. Co-op. 1981).
45 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6 (Michie Co-op 1981). The child's rights with regard to his
parents are also terminated. For example, in most cases, the child loses his right of inheritance. See
id, § 7.
49 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 26 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch.
210, § 3(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). Chapter 210, § 3 provides that the best interests of the child
should guide the court in deciding whether to grant a petition to dispense with parental consent
to adoption. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981). The statute, however, defines
the child's best interests in terms of the fitness of his parents. Id. § 3(c). Chapter 119, § 26 uses the
best interests standard hut, section 1 of Chapter 119, provides that substitute care should be
provided in the "event of the absence, temporary or permanent inability or unfitness of parents to
provide care and protection for their children." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 1 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1975).
" See, e.g., In re Rauch, 358 Mass. 327, 329, 264 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970) (guardianship petition);
Duclos v. Edwards, 344 Mass. 544, 546, 183 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1962) (guardianship petition); Stinson
v. Meegan, 318 Mass. 459, 462-63, 62 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1945) (habeas corpus proceeding); Richards
v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 551, 180 N.E. 508, 510 (1932) (guardianship petition); Purinton v.
Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 201, 80 N.E. 802, 805 (1907) (adoption proceeding).
" Note, supra note 13, at 152-53. See, e.g., Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass.
704, 711-12, 467 N.E.2d 851, 857 (1984).. For a discussion of the parental fitness test see infra notes
197-204, and accompanying text.
52 S. KATZ, SUM. note 1, at 4.
53
 Id.; Note, .supra note 13, at 155.
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rights of the parents — the "blood tie" — constitutes the decisive element in the decision-
making process. 54
The best interests and parental fitness tests focus on different aspects of the parent-
child relationship in resolving child-custody disputes. The best interests test focuses on
the rights of the neglected children, while the parental fitness test focuses on the rights
of the natural parents. This difference in emphasis leads to different results. 55 The state
is therefore more likely to be successful in intervening in the parent-child relationship
under the best interests standard than it is under the parental fitness test. 56
The legislature historically has given wide discretion to trial-court judges to decide
each child-custody case on its facts and to develop their own standards as to what
constitutes a "neglected" child. While it has always been clear in Massachusetts that,
under certain circumstances, the state can intervene to protect the welfare of children,
the judicial justification for such intervention has varied. Moreover, as the state has
assumed ever-increasing responsibility for the care and protection of "neglected" chil-
dren,57 the legislative standard for such intervention and its subsequent judicial inter-
pretation have evolved.
In Massachusetts, the Supreme Judicial Court has tong struggled with balancing the
often competing interests of natural parent and child in custody disputes. The early
decisions of the Supreme Judicial Court favored the best interests of the child standard.
In 1907, for example, in Purinton v. Jamrock, 58 the Supreme Judicial Court stated that
parents did not have an absolute right to custody of their children." According to the
court, a parent's right would not be enforced to the detriment of the happiness or well-
being of the child." The Purinton court further held that the right to custody was
conditioned on the ability or fitness of the parents to provide for and protect their
child. 9 '
The 1932 landmark case of Richards v. Forrest,°2 a guardianship proceeding, brought
into clearer focus the conflict between the parental fitness standard and the best interests
of the child standard.° The guardianship statute allowed the court to give custody and
care of the child to petitioning guardians if the natural parents were found "'unfit to
have such custody.'”" Yet, despite this statutorily defined standard of unfitness, the court
" See Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 367 Mass. 631, 647-51, 328 N.E.2d 854, 863-65 (1975) (Hennessey, J., dissenting).





anti-interventionist commentators recognize that the state has assumed an ever increas-
ing role in child-rearing. Wald, supra note 2, at 989 n.25. The ancient notion of' the child as the
private property of its parents has lost much of its vitality. S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 4.
so 195 Mass. 187, 80 N.E. 802 (1907).
59 Id. at 201, 80 N.E. at 805.
6' r Id.
GI Id.
The right of the parents is not an absolute right of property, but is in the nature of a
trust reposed in them, and is subject to the correlative duty to care for and protect
the child; and the law secures their right only so long as they shall discharge their
obligation.
Id.
" 278 Mass. 547, 180 N.E. 805 (1932).
es
	 id. at 554, 180 N.E. at 511.
" Id. at 552, 180 N.E. at 510 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 201, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981).
The court defined "unfit" as follows:
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concluded that "the first and paramount duty of the courts is to consult the welfare of
the child . Rio that governing principle every other public and private consideration
must yield." 65 The court ruled that the welfare of the child could not properly have been
ignored by directing attention exclusively to the abstract question whether the parents
were unfit. 66 While the guardianship statute directed the court to consider only the
fitness of the parents in deciding whether to intervene in the parent-child relationship,
the court indicated that precedent dictated that the term "fitness" be interpreted in terms
of the welfare or best interests of the child 67 Hence, after the Richards decision, the
parental fitness and best interests standards were intertwined in Massachusetts. As the
Richards court noted, however, the court's paramount consideration was still the welfare
of the child. 62
In 1975, in Petition of The New England Home For Little Wanderers to Dispense with
Consent to Adoption, 69 the Supreme Judicial Court formally adopted an approach to child-
custody adjudication which considered both the fitness of the biological parents and the
best interests of the child. 70 In that case, the mother of the child argued that the court
should apply the parental fitness test rather than the best interests standard in deciding
whether to grant a petition dispensing with her consent to adoption."' L The court rejected
In general, the word means unsuitable, incompetent, or not adapted for a particular
use or service. As applied to the relation of rational parents to their child, the word
usually although not necessarily imports something of moral delinquency. Violence of
temper, indifference or vacillation of feeling toward the child, or inability or indis-
position to control unparental traits of character or conduct, might constitute unfitness.
So, also, incapacity to appreciate and perform the obligations resting upon parents
might render them unfit, apart from other moral defects. Parents are the natural
guardians of their children. They are under the legal as well as the moral obligation
to support and educate them and to bring them up to be healthy, intelligent and
virtuous ... citizens.
Id. at 552-53, 18e N.E. at 510-11.
's Id. at 553, 180 N.E. at 511.
66 /d. at 554, 180 N.E. at 511. The court stated that "[t]he unfitness of parents in this section
of the statute must be determined with respect both to their own character, temperament, capacity,
and conduct, and to the welfare of the child in connection with its age, environment and affections."
Id.
67 Id. at 553, 180 N.E. at 511.
6" Id. From 1945 to 1975 the court consistently reaffirmed this notion in child-custody cases.
See, e.g., In re Rauch, 358 Mass. 327, 329, 264 N.E.2d 371, 373 (1970) (in deciding guardianship
petition, court must consider best interests of the child in determining whether parents are unfit);
Duclos v. Edwards, 344 Mass. 544, 546, 183 N.E.2d 708, 709 (1962) (unsuitability of guardian must
be measured with reference primarily to the welfare of the child); Stinson v. Meegan, 318 Mass.
459, 462-63, 62 N.E.2d 113, 115 (1945) (in habeas corpus proceeding involving minor child, the
welfare of the child was the court's primary consideration).
67 367 Mass. 631, 328 N.E.2d 854 (1975).
7° Id. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860. In Little Wanderers, the mother voluntarily placed her newborn
baby with a child-care institution. Id. at 633-34, 328 N.E.2d at 856. Ten months later, the institution
filed a petition under chapter 210, § 3 to dispense with the mother's consent to adoption. Id. at
631-32, 328 N.E.2d at 855. Chapter 210, § 3 provides that petitions dispensing with parental
consent to adoption shall he granted if the court finds that doing so would serve the "best interests
of the child." MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981).
7, Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. at 636, 328 N.E.2d at 858. The mother argued that since the
agency's custody had originated from her voluntary consent, and, since she subsequently withdrew
that consent, she therefore had never relinquished legal custody of the child to the child-care
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the mother's arguments and ruled that both the best interests and parental fitness
standards were to be applied in deciding child-custody cases concerning neglected chil-
dren. 72 According to the court, the best interests of the child were to be considered in
determining whether the parents were unfit." The court stated that the two standards
"reflect different degrees of emphasis on the same factors ... [and] are not separate
and distinct but cognate and connected." 74 The court did, however, reject the notion of
"precipitate" attempts to dispense with parental consent to adoption merely because a
foster care situation had occurred." The court ruled that before parental consent to
adoption could be waived parents must be shown "to have grievous shortcomings or
handicaps that would put the child's welfare in the family milieu much at hazard."'"
Although the best interests standard was still the paramount consideration of the court,"
the rights of the natural parents, the court found, were an important secondary consid-
eration in child-custody disputes." While the exact interrelationship between the two
standards was not explained, the court indicated that the best interests of the child was
still to be the primary consideration of the courts in deciding child custody cases."
The dissent in Little Wanderers, written by Justice Hennessey, flatly disagreed with
the majority's equation of the two standards. 8° justice Hennessey maintained that, under
a best interests test, the rights of the parents were subordinated to the rights of the
child." The best interests standard was, he indicated, less protective of parents' rights
than the parental fitness standard. 82 According to Justice Hennessey, the two standards
brought to "the fore considerations different in kind and degree." 88 Justice Hennessey
stated that he would give the mother's rights in Little Wanderers more weight than they
were accorded by the majority's use of what was essentially the best interests of the child
standard. 84 He asserted, in accord with the parental right doctrine, that a petition to
institution. Id. She thus contended that the chapter 210, 3 "best interests" standard should not be
applied to her case: she maintained that the best interests test should only be applied when the
parent has already been deprived of custody of her child by court action. Id. In cases where the
child has been voluntarily relinquished, she asserted that a showing of parental unfitness, like that
required under the guardianship statute, was necessary to deprive a parent of custody. Id.
' 2 Id. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860.
73 Id. at 641 (quoting Kauch, 358 Mass. at 329, 264 N.E.2d at 373).
" Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860. The court went so far as to conclude
that the petition would have been granted under both the best interests of the child and the parental
fitness tests. Id. at 645, 328 N.E.2d at 862-63.
" Id. at 646, 328 N.E.2d at 863.
" Id.
" Id. at 640, 328 N.E.2d at 860.
" Id. at 646, 328 N.E.2d at 863.
" Id. at 641, 328 N.E.2d at 860.
m° Id. at 647, 647-48 n.1, 328 N.E.2d at 864 11.1 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
34 Id. at 648, 328 N.E.2d at 864 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 648, 650, 328 N.E.2d at 864, 865 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
Under a best interests test the rights of the parent are likely to be heavily subordinated
to those of the child while under an unfitness test the focus of inquiry is more on the
conduct and character of the parent as it affects the child, although, of course, unfitness
involves the interests of the child.
Id. at 648, 328 N.E.2d at 864 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 650, 328 N.E.2d at 865 (Hennessey, J., dissenting).
" Id.
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dispense with parental consent to adoption should be denied unless the parents have
been shown to be unfit.85 This finding, he maintained, was not supported by the facts
in Little Wanderers. 86
Justice Hennessey thus advocated a less interventionist approach to state involvement
in the parent-child relationship than did the Little Wanderers majority. By focusing pri-
marily on the fitness of the parents, rather than on the welfare of the child, Justice
Hennessey indicated a desire to tip the balance between child, state, and parents in
"favor" of the parents.° Under the standard advocated by Justice Hennessey, the rights
of the child would be subordinated to the rights of the parents.
In the years between 1975 and the present, Justice Hennessey's dissenting viewpoint
became the majority position of the Supreme Judicial Court in all child-custody cases."'
This shift in the child-custody standard occurred gradually."s For example, in the 1979
case of Custody of a Minor (1)," the Supreme Judicial Court focused its inquiry on the
fitness of the parent rather than on the welfare of the child. Chief Justice Hennessey,
writing for the court, held that a finding of "current parental unfitness" was required in
a proceeding in which parents were threatened with the loss of their children.`' While
85 Id.
86 Id.
A 7 See id. Justice Hennessey concluded that he "would give the mother's rights in this case more
weight than accorded them under the best interests standard." Id.
"See supra notes 69-87 and accompanying text and infra notes 89-106 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the shift in the majority's position. Seven months after the court's decision
in Little Wanderers, Justice Hennessey because Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court.
89 In 1978, for example, Chief Justice Hennessey applied the dual standard of the Little Wanderers
majority to a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption. Petition of the Department of
Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 265-66, 381 N.E.2d 565,
572-73 (1978). See ch. 210, § 3. The court upheld the decree granting the petition pursuant to
chapter 210, section 3. 376 Mass. at 256, 381 N.E.2d at 571. The court rejected the parents'
arguments that intervention in this case would violate the protection afforded the family by the
United States Constitution and both federal and state statutes, id. at 256-57, 381 N.E.2d at 568,
and firmly upheld the state's authority to intervene in the parent-child relationship when the natural
parents were unable to assume responsibility for their children and adoption would serve the child's
best interests. Id. at 263, 381 N.E.2d at 572.
It should be observed that the mother in this case had physically abused her child and had
been diagnosed as a borderline psychotic. Id. at '257, 381 N.E.2d at 565. At one point, she had
stated that "she would kill the babies." Id. at 258, 381 N.E.2d at 565. Thus, in a case so clearly
calling for state intervention, the court may have been reluctant to concentrate on the fitness of the
mother at the expense of the child's welfare.
96 377 Mass. 876, 389 N.E.2d 68 (1979). In this case, the Department of Public Welfare
petitioned the municipal court, under chapter 119, § 24, to provide care and protection for a
mother's newly born baby. Id. at 877, 389 N.E.2c1 at 70. The department's petition was based on
the mother's long history of neglectful parenting with her other children. Id. at 878-79, 389 N.E.2d
at 71.
91 Id. at 880, 389 N.E.2d at 72. It is not at all clear upon what precedent Justice Hennessey
based this new formulation of the dual standard proposed in Little Wanderers. He stated that
[w]hile there may have been some question in prior years regarding the kinds of
evidence sufficient to prove cases, like those under c. 119, where a parent stands to
lose custody of a child ... it is now clear that the Commonwealth may not attempt to
force the breakup of a natural family without an affirmative showing of parental
unfitness. Little Wanderers, supra at 641 -42. Quillon v. Walcott, supra at 225.
Id. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
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admitting that some confusion had existed in the past regarding the proper standard to
be used in child-custody proceedings, the court maintained that it was now clear that
the state could not intervene in the parent-child relationship without an affirmative
showing of parental unfitness.92 The court briefly mentioned the best interests test. The
court asserted that since the interests of the child were best secured in the stable,
continuous environment of his or her own family, state intervention in that relationship
was justified only when parents were unable to provide for their children's care and
protection."
In Custody of a Minor (1), the Supreme Judicial Court essentially adopted a strict
parental right standard which made it more difficult for the state to intervene in the
parent-child relationship."' The court indicated that Massachusetts courts should pre-
sume that the best interests of the child were served in his or her biological family. 95
Judges in child-custody cases, the court ruled, must enter "specific and detailed" findings
of fact which "persuasively" show the necessity of removing the child from his or her
parents. 96 Thus, the less interventionist approach to child custody that Justice Hennessey
had advocated in dissent in Little Wanderers had now become the majority position of the
Supreme Judicial Court.
A few months after its decision in Custody of a Minor (1), the Supreme Judicial Court,
in Custody of a Minor (2),° 7 attempted to demonstrate that the parental fitness standard
was still related to the welfare of the child. The court ruled that the unfitness of the
parents must be shown to "endanger the well-being of [the] child." 92 The court asserted,
however, that only "grievous" shortcomings which seriously endangered the child's wel-
fare would constitute parental unfitness. Thus, while the court re-established, to some
extent, the best interests of the child element of the dual standard proposed in Little




94 The Supreme Judicial Court's use of the Supreme Courts landmark decision, Prince v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. l58 (1944), illustrates the court's desire to bring a less
interventionist approach to child-custody cases. In Custody of a Minor (1), the court quoted a portion
of the Prince opinion which noted the existence of a "'private realm of family life which the state
cannot enter. — 377 Mass. at 880, 389 N.E.2d at 72 (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 166). In the past,
however, the court had used the Prince opinion to justify state intervention in the parent-child
relationship, See, e.g., Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 376 Mass. 252, 265, 381 N.E.2d 565, 572 (1978); Little Wanderers, 367 Mass. at 642, 328
N.E.2d at 861. While the Prince Court did recognize that the family, in general, does have a right
to privacy, it also recognized that the family was not "beyond regulation in the public interest."
Prince, 321 U.S. at 166. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court's use of Prince can, at best, only be
termed selective.
99 Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
96 Id. at 886, 389 N.E.2d at 75. The court, in Custody of a Minor (1), upheld the judge's custody
award to the department. Id.
"2 378 Mass. 712, 393 N.E.2d 379 (1979).
96 Id. at 722, 393 N.E.2d at 385. "The crucial questions are: From what shortcomings or
handicaps does the parent suffer that would endanger the well being of this child if exposed and
has the necessity of permanently removing the child from its parent persuasively been shown?" Id.
Thus, the court indicated that the well-being of the child should be defined as a function of the
fitness of the child's parent. Id.
99 See id. at 719, 722, 393 N.E.2d at 383, 385.
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This approach was reinforced in a 1980 decision, Bezio v. Patenaude.'"" In Bezio, the
court, faced with a petition by a mother to revoke guardianship,'" stated that the critical
question was whether the natural parents were "currently fit to further the welfare and
best interests of the child."IO 2 According to the court, "inleither the 'parental fitness' test
nor the 'best interests of the child' test is properly applied to the exclusion of the other."'"
The court therefore reversed the lower court's denial of the mothei's petition to remove
the guardian and regain custody of her children and remanded the case to the probate
court for a determination of whether the mother was currently fit to advance the best
interests of her children.'"
In child-custody cases decided after Little Wanderers, the Supreme Judicial Court
thus exhibited an increasing reluctance to intervene in the parent-child relationship. In
these cases, the court changed the emphasis of its standard for determining whether the
state's intervention in the parent-child relationship was proper: if' the natural parents
were "fit," then the child's interests were best served with them. While this test appeared
nominally to incorporate both the parental fitness and best interests standards, in apply-
ing the test, the court focused primarily on parental fitness.
Finally, in 1981, in Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense With Consent
to Adoption,'°5 the court explicitly recognized the primacy of parental rights in child-
custody cases.'" While the welfare of the child was still a factor, the court presumed that
a child's interests were best served in the family environment provided by the child's
natural parents.'" For this reason, the court noted formally that parental rights, rather
than the rights of the child, should be the court's primary consideration in deciding
whether the state has properly exercised its parens patriae power.'" According to the
court, the unfitness standard must be applied whenever the state seeks to intervene in
any manner in the parent-child relationship.'" By continuing to define the best interests
of the child in terms of the fitness of his or her parents, the court thereby limited state
intervention in the parent-child relationship and effectively reduced the standard for
intervention to the parental fitness test."°
Furthermore, the court refused to recognize a "per se" rule that prospective adoptive
foster parents, who have effectively become a "parent" to the child, should under certain
106 381 Mass. 563, 410 N.E.2d 1207 (1980).
":" The custody provision of the guardianship statute requires a showing of parental unfitness
in order to deprive the parent of custody. See MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 210, § 5 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1981).
")2 Bezio, 381 Mass. at 576, 410 N.E.2d at 1214.
1°5 Id. at 576-77, 410 N.E.2d at 1214-15.
Id. at 579, 410 N.E.2d at 1216.
383 Mass. 573, 421 N.E.2d 28 (1981).
166 Id. at 587-93, 421 N.E.2d at 36-38.
' 07 Id. at 588, 421 N.E.2d at 36. The court cited Professor Mnookin for the proposition that
disruption of the parent-child relationship carries significant risks for the child. Id. (citing Mnookin,
Child -Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Ineleierminancy, 39 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS.
226, 265 (1975).
138 Petition, 383 Mass. at 588-89, 421 N.E.2d at 37.
L 09 Id. at 589, 421 N.E.2d at 37. The court included in this statement the care and protection
statute, see Mass. ANN. Laws ch. 119, §§ 23-29 (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1986), the adoption
statute, see MASS. ANN. Laws ch. 210, § 3 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981), and the guardianship statute,
see id. § 5.
"° See 383 Mass. at 589, 421 N.E.2d at 37. The court stated that unfitness was the "standard
by which we measure the circumstances within the family as they affect the child's welfare." Id.
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circumstances automatically prevail in a custody dispute with the child's natural par-
ents."' In other words, the court rejected the notion of mandatory, fixed time periods
within which natural parents would be allowed to regain their children presently living
with foster parents. 12 Thus, in Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with
Consent to Adoption, although the child in question had been with her foster parents for
four years,'" and despite the existence of evidence which suggested parental unfitness,
the court held that the lower court judge had failed to make the requisite finding of
parental unfitness and rejected the judge's "wholesale incorporation" of a psychiatrist's
testimony, which had indicated that a break in the child's relationship with his foster
parents would be "devastating" to the child. 14 The court once again sent a message to
the lower courts that consideration of the child's best interests, without specific and
detailed findings of parental unfitness, would be insufficient to justify state intervention
in the parent-child relationship. 15
In 1983, the Supreme Judicial Court re-examined the interrelationship between the
best interests standard and the parental fitness test, 16 and further restricted the rights
"I Id. at 591 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 n.16, The court's reluctance to recognize the importance
of psychological bonding by children to foster parents goes against psychological theory and is
contrary to the court's central premise that the child's interests are best served in a "stable, contin-
uous family environment." Id. at 588, 421 N.E.2d at 36.
" 2 See id. at 591 n.16, 421 N.E.2d at 38 n.16.
i" Id. at 574, 421 N.E.2d at 29.
," Id. at 593, 421 N.E.2d at 39. At the time of birth, the child's mother was in the Massachusetts
Correctional Institution at Framingham. Id. at 574, 421 N.E.2d at 29. The child had been with her
prospective foster parents since she was two years old. Id. They were, in effect, the only parents
she had ever known.
See id. at 574, 421 N.E.2d at 29. See also Petition of the Department of Social Services to
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 113, 119, 461 N.E.2d 186, 190 (1984). The court
reversed the lower court's decree granting the petition and remanded the case for further findings
as to the parent's unfitness. Petition, 383 Mass. at 594, 421 N.E.2d at 40.
"fi See Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 765, 452 N.E.2d 483, 489 (1983); Petition of the
Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389 Mass. 793, 799, 452
N.E.2d 497, 501 (1983). In Custody of a Minor, the court maintained that state intervention in the
parent-child relationship was "justified only when parents appear unable to provide for their
children's care and protection. — 389 Mass. at 765, 452 N.E.2d at 489 (quoting Custody of a Minor
(1), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979)). The critical issue was still whether the parents
were currently fit to further the best interests of the child. Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. at 766, 452
N.E.2d at 490. "In that sense, the fitness of the parents and the best interests of the child are
related." Id. at 766, 452 N.E.2d at 489-90. The court, in accordance with the Supreme Court's
decision in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), held that evidence supporting a finding of
unfitness must be "clear and convincing." Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. at 766, 452 N.E.2d at 490.
The Supreme Court's decision had very little effect on the Supreme Judicial Court's parental
unfitness standard: specific and detailed findings of fact were still required in order to remove a
child from his or her natural parents. Id. at 767, 452 N.E.2d at 490. The court held that the lower
court judge had given "inappropriate weight" to the child's welfare as evidenced by the special
weight the judge had given the child's own wishes. Id. at 769, 452 N.E.2d at 491. The district court
judge observed that "[tihe minor child has a valid and enforceable right in determining the direction
of her future life especially where her circumstances from birth to date were as they were in this
case and she should not be compelled to revert to a life for which she obviously has a ;distaste] and
aversion." Id. Despite the existence of a "stable, loving and devoted relationship," id. at 768, 452
N.E.2d at 491, between the foster mother and the child, the court held that the wishes of the child
were not controlling. Id. at 769, 452 N.E.2d at 491. The controlling question was "whether the
welfare of this child would be seriously endangered if custody is not transferred from the mother."
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of foster parents seeking to adopt a foster child. In Petitions of the Department of Social
Service to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,' 17 the court considered a custody dispute
between a child's natural parents and his or her prospective adoptive foster parents."B
While granting the petition to dispense with consent to adoption, the court considered
the natural mother's contention that the statutory presumption that foster parents should
be entitled to adopt children who have been in their care more than a year was uncon-
stitutional. 19 In dictum, the court stated that this presumption was unconstitutional as
a violation of the natural parents' due process rights.'" The court, therefore, having
previously rejected prospective adoptive foster parents' right to adopt children in their
long-time care under a per se rule, now rejected their right to a statutory presumption.
In effect, then, the court protected the rights of biological parents to regain their children
from foster parents, even after lengthy separations from them.
In the years after the Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Little Wanderers, the court
increasingly focused on the rights of natural parents in child-custody disputes. At the
same time, as a result of the court's apparent retreat from the best interests of the child
standard, trial court judges struggled with the application of the dual standard proposed
in Little Wanderers.' 21 Especially after the court's decision in Custody of a Minor (I), trial
court judges appeared confused as to the role of the best interests standard in deciding
child-custody cases.' 22 Faced with the difficulties and confusion resulting from its shift
in focus to the parental fitness standard, the court in 1984 attempted to clarify the
standard through two child-custody cases.'"
Id. Thus, once again focusing attention primarily on the fitness of the parent rather than on the
welfare of the child, the court reversed the lower court's award of custody to the Department of
Social Services and denied the power of the state to intervene in the parent-child relationship absent
a clear showing that the child's parents were unfit and that the child's welfare would be seriously
endangered if the state did not intervene. Id. at 769-70, 452 N.E.2d at 491-92. While the primary
consideration of the court was the fitness of the parents, the best interests of the child still received
some judicial notice. See id. Perhaps this was so because in this case the court was affirming the
lower court's approval of state intervention in the parent-child relationship.
Ii 7 389 Mass. 793, 452 N.E.2d 497 (1983).
1,13 Id. at 793-94, 452 N.E.2d 498-99.
119 /d. at 802-03, 452 N.E.2d at 503. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 3(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op.
1981) provides in pertinent part:
If said child has been in the care of the department or a licensed child care agency
for more than one year ... there shall be a presumption that the best interests of the
child will he served by granting a petition for adoption ... or by issuing a decree
dispensing with the need for consent.
L20 389 Mass. at 802-03, 452 N.E.2d at 503.
' 2 ' See, e.g., Custody of a Minor (I), 377 Mass. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
122 See, e.g., Petition of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
391 Mass. 113, 461 N.E.2d 186 (1984); Custody of a Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983).
129 in 1984, the court reaffirmed the present dominance of the parental right doctrine
in Massachusetts. See Petition of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 391 Mass. 113, 118-20, 461 N.E.2d 186, 190-91 (1984). In this case, the court held that
it was error to base the allowance of a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption on a
finding that the child would he hurt by being returned to the natural parent. Id. at 119, 461 N.E.2d
at 190. If the parent was fit, the court asserted, the petition to dispense with consent should be
denied. Id. The court referred to the allowance of a petition to dispense with parental consent to
adoption as an "extreme step" which required "clear and convincing evidence that the parent's
unfitness to assume parental responsibility is such that it would be in the best interests of the child
for all legal relations to be ended." Id. The court again held that a lower court judge had made
inadequate findings as to the issue of parental fitness. Id.
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II. THE PRESENT MASSACHUSETTS STANDARD
In August of 1984, the Supreme judicial Court decided two important child-custody
cases together. 124 The court, at this time, was approaching child-custody cases with several
"tests." First, and most importantly, the court maintained that parents were presump-
tively entitled to the custody of their children unless they were affirmatively shown to
be unfit. In As a corollary to this test, the court asserted that a child's interests were best
served by being with his or her natural parents.' 26 And finally, as a consequence of both
these presumptions, the court firmly refused to recognize that foster parents, after a
period of time, become a child's "psychological" parents. 127
The first of these cases, Care and Protection of Three Minors,' 28 added a new dimension
to the Massachusetts standard for state intervention in the parent-child relationship. In
this case, the court considered care and protection petitions filed by the Department of
Public Welfare' 29 on behalf of three minor sisters.' 3° The mother of the children had
been abused physically as a child by her parents.' 51 After the mother's first child was
born, her husband became physically abusive toward her.' 22 Shortly afterward, the par-
ents separated.'"
' 24 See Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 467 N.E.2d 851 (1984); Custody
of a Minor (2), 392 Mass. 719, 467 N.E.2d 1286 (1984). See also' Petition of the Department of Social
Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 467 N.E.2d 861 (1984).
12 ' See Petitions of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
389 Mass. 793, 799, 452 N.E.2d 497, 501 (1983).
See Custody of a Minor (1), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979).
127 See Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
383 Mass. 573, 591 n.16, 421 N.E.2d 28, 38 n.16 (1981). See also Petition of the Department of
Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 389 Mass. 793, 802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503
(1983).
128 392 Mass. 704, 467 N.E.2d 851 (1984).
129 The Department of Public Welfare is now known as the Department of Social Services. See
supra note 33.
' 3° Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 705, 467 N.E.2d at 853. On April 18, 1978, a social worker for
the Department of Public Welfare filed petitions pursuant to chapter 119, § 24 on behalf of three
minor sisters. Id. On September 13, 1979, a judge of the Chelsea District Court found all three
girls in need of care and protection and committed them to the department pursuant to chapter
119, § 26. Id. After a trial de novo in the Appellate Division of the Juvenile Court pursuant to
chapter 119, § 27, the children were again committed to the custody of the department. id. at 705,
467 N.E.2d at 853-54.
Following this award of custody, the mother, the children, and the maternal grandmother filed
notices of appeal. Id. at 706, 467 N.E.2d at 854. Because the department was planning to move the
two older children from their foster home, the mother sought a stay of the dispositional order,
which was denied by the trial court on July 29, 1983. Id. She appealed this denial to the appeals
court. Id. A single justice denied the application For a stay pending appeal and on September 13,
1983, transferred the cases to the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County. Id. On November
19, 1983, the single justice reserved and reported the cases for decision to the full court of the
Supreme Judicial Court. Id.
'Si Id.
' 32 Id.
'" Id. at 706, 467 N.E.2d at 855. In 1976, the couple's second child was born. Id. The couple
temporarily reunited and, in 1977, their third child was born. Id. at 707, 467 N.E.2d at 855. The
marriage deteriorated at a rapid pace and the police were summoned on numerous occasions to
prevent the father from beating the mother. Id. Eventually, the father left the family and the mother
moved to Chelsea with the three children. Id.
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The Department of Public Welfare became involved in 1978 when the mother
became ill and was hospitalized.' 34
 The children were left with a babysitter who left them
alone without care.'" The department was notified by the police and, on April 14, 1978,
pursuant to chapter 119, the children were taken into the department's care." 6
 The
children were examined at a local hospital and placed in temporary foster care.'" On
the same day, the department, pursuant to chapter 119, section 24, filed a care and
protection petition in the district court. 138
 On June 9, 1978, the physical custody of the
two oldest children was returned to the mother, although legal custody remained in the
department.' 39
 The department offered several times to return the youngest child to
her mother's care, but she did not accept their offers.""
On February 16, 1979, the department was notified that the mother had left the
two oldest children with a neighbor and had not returned.' 4 ' The children had severe
colds and head lice and were living in an unheated apartment.' 42
 The children were
placed in a foster home where they lived until July 1983.' 43 At that time, they were
moved to their paternal grandparents' home. 19 '
In considering the department's petition for permanent custody of the three chil-
dren, the court began its analysis by stating the oft repeated standard: removal of a child
from the custody of his or her parents may be ordered only if there is clear and
convincing evidence] ." that the parent is currently unfit to care for that child.' 46 In
addition, the court noted, the judge must make specific and detailed findings of fact.' 47
'" Id.
'" Id. at 707-08, 467 N.E.2d at 855.
136 Id. at 708, 467 N.E.2d at 855. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 23E (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1975)
provides in relevant part that any minor "who is seemingly without a parent or legal guardian
available shall be immediately reported to the department, which shall proceed to arrange care for
such child temporarily and shall forthwith cause search to be made for parent or guardian."








	 Since 1979, the mother had changed apartments frequently. Id. at 709, 467 N.E.2d at
855. She was plagued with health problems which made steady employment difficult. Id. at 709,
467 N.E.2d at 856. In October of 1982 the mother was knifed in an incident involving a former
boyfriend. Id. The record showed that the mother had resisted therapy and counselling programs
urged by the department and was unreliable in keeping appointments with case workers and
therapists. Id. Similarly, she was inconsistent in maintaining visits with her children. Id. When the
visits did take place they were, however, generally successful. Id. at 710, 467 N.E.2d at 856. Some
troublesome incidents did occur: during one visit, the mother left the children by themselves and
did not return for four clays. Id. It should be noted that the mother contested some of the lower
court judge's findings of fact. Id. at 711, 467 N.E.2d at 857. The Supreme judicial Court held that,
while there were sonic errors in the judge's findings of fact, given other evidence indicating the
mother's unfitness, that "error does not appear to have unfairly influenced the judge's ultimate
conclusion." Id.
15
 For a discussion of the Supreme Court's decision in Sanlosky, which required that evidence
supporting a finding of parental unfitness be clear and convincing, see supra note 116.
146
 Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 711-12, 467 N.E.2d at 857.
147 Id. at 712, 467 N.E.2d at 857. These findings, the court stated, may not be based on
inappropriate factors, such as disapproval of a parent's way of life or a comparison of the material
advantages a foster parent may offer with those offered by the natural parents. Id.
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In this case, the court found that the lower court judge's findings were adequate to
support his order that the children be removed from their mother.' 48 The court upheld
the department's intervention in the parent-child relationship under the parental fitness
test, 149 According to the court, the district court judge had correctly found the mother
to be currently unfit to provide for her children. 15°
The court noted, however, that the parental fitness and best interests of the child
tests are not mutually exclusive but rather "'reflect different degrees of emphasis on the
same factors. -15 ' Moreover, the court held for the first time that the judge's task in a
care and protection proceeding was not complete once he had determined that the
children should be removed from their mother's custody. The court held that the judge
should have "addressed the various placement options which would further the children's
best interests." 452 Moreover, the court found that the judge should have issued more
than a general dispositional order committing the children to the permanent custody of
the department.'" The court stated that the judge's findings concerning the disposition
of the children were deficient in two respects: he had failed to address both the impor-
tance of the sibling relationship and the question of whether placement of all three
children with their paternal grandparents would be in the best interests of the children. 154
Although chapter 119, section 26 and the applicable regulations of the department
only require the judge to make a simple commitment order concerning a child's place-
ment in a care and protection proceeding, in this case the court held that the judge
should have given the department some guidance as to the ultimate placement of the
children and the visitation rights of the children's family.' 55 The court pointedly noted
L" Id. The court listed the following as evidence of the mother's unfitness: (1) she had left the
children with unreliable caretakers; (2) she had been erratic and unreliable in her visits to the
children; (3) she had not provided a clean, healthy home for the children; (4) she had not maintained
any sort of financial stability; and (5) she had been unable to provide the children with the
psychological nurturing they needed. Id. at 713, 467 N.E.2d at 858.
1 4 9 id. at 712, 467 N.E.2d at 857.
1" Id. at 712, 467 N.E.2d at 858.
151 Id. at 714, 467 N.E.2d at 858 (quoting Petition of the New England Home for Little
Wanderers, 367 Mass. 631, 641, 328 N.E.2d 854, 860 (1975)).
1" 392 Mass. at 714, 467 N.E.2d at 858.
," Id. The department was planning to leave the youngest sister with her foster parents, who
intended to adopt her and to move the two oldest sisters to their paternal grandparents, who also
intended to adopt them. Id. at 714, 467 N.E.2d at 859. The court observed that the obvious
alternative to the department's plan was for all three sisters to be adopted by their grandparents.
Id, In that way, the sisters would be together and they would remain within the natural family. Id.
1 " Id. at 715, 467 N.E.2d at 859. The Supreme Judicial Court noted that the courts of Massa
chusetts had long recognized the importance of siblings being raised together. Id. Further, it also
has been a policy of the courts to keep children within the natural family. The state was required
to make every effort to strengthen and encourage family life before intervening in the parent-child
relationship. Id. at 715 n.17, 467 N.E.2d at 859 n.17. The lower court judge found that removal of
the youngest sister from her foster home would be psychologically devastating to the child. Id. at
716, 467 N.E.2d at 860. The Supreme Judicial Court stated: "Although we have said that separation
from natural parents and bonding with foster parents may result in a finding of parental unfitness,
such circumstances are rare ... Moo often the claim that bonding justifies adoption is the result of
a self-fulfilling prophecy." Id. at 716 n.18, 467 N.E2d at 860 n.18. Thus, by not considering the
need for the youngest sister to be raised with her other sisters or by her grandparents, the lower
court failed to demonstrate that the youngest child's best interests had been adequately considered.
Id. at 716, 467 N.E.2d at 860.
155 Id. at 717, 467 N.E.2d at 860. The court stated that although such an order was not required
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that the Department of Social Services enjoyed great latitude in determining matters of
parental fitness and child custody in both care and protection and adoption proceed-
ings.' 56 Quoting two commentators critical of the department's control of child-custody
cases, the court indicated that the critical decisions in such cases were made by depart-
ment caseworkers and that courts often had the mistaken notion that these caseworkers
always knew what was best for the child. 157
The Supreme Judicial Court thus called for more judicial direction and control
when permanent custody of the child was awarded to the department.'" Despite a correct
finding by the district court judge that the mother currently was unfit, the court held
that the lower court judge had inadequately addressed the various placement options
which would further the child's best interests. 159 In particular, the district court judge's
dispositional order had ignored the importance of both the sibling relationship and the
presumption in Massachusetts in favor of keeping children within the natural family. 16°
Hence, the court based its rejection of the trial court's disposition of the case on the
presumption that a child's best interests are served by his natural family — a preference
that extends even to grandparents. Further, to ensure that the department did not
ignore its preference for the biological family, the court held that trial court judges were
to "guide" the department both in placing the children pursuant to a care and protection
proceeding and in continued visitation by the natural family. In this role, trial court
judges were to act, above all, in accord with the court's presumption in favor of the
biological family. 16 '
On the same day that it decided Care and Protection of Three Minors, the Supreme
Judicial Court also decided Custody of a Minor (2). 162 This case, as had Care and Protection
of Three Minors, involved a care and protection petition. 165 The child in question was
by the statute, given the fact that the judge knew of both the department's plans to separate the
sisters and of the grandparent's willingness to adopt the sisters, his order should have been more
detailed. Id.
156 Id. at 717, 467 N.E.2d 861.
'" Id. at 717-18, 467 N.E.2d at 861. The court observed:
"the courts play a minimal role in exercising the state's care and protection policy.
The real locus of decision making is within [the department) and the individual who
tends to be the ultimate decision maker there, is the case worker" .... As a critic more
recently said, "[t]he paternalistic justification of this broad direction — that the profes-
sionals and not the parents always know what is best for children — underlies most
of what is wrong with the present system."
Id. at 718, 467 N.E.2d at 861 (citations omitted) (quoting Campbell, The Neglected Child, 4 SUFFOLK
U.L. REV. 632, 645-46 (1970); McCathren, Accountability in the Child Protection System: A Defense of
the Proposed Standards Relating to Abuse and Neglect, 57 B.U.L. REV. 707, 731 (1977)).
'" See 392 Mass. at 718, 467 N.E.2d at 861. In Three Minors, the court stated that if the trial
court judge was to separate the youngest sister from her older sisters and her grandparents, the
judge was required to give direction concerning continued visitation by the natural family. Id. If
the judge concluded that visitation by the natural family should not be allowed, he was now required
to make findings that supported this conclusion. Id.
159 Id. at 712, 467 N.E.2d at 857.
160 Id. at 715, 467 N.E.2d at 859. For these reasons, the court remanded the case to the juvenile
court. Id. at 718, 467 N.E.2d at 861.
161 See id. at 715 n.17, 467 N.E.2d at 859 n.17.
162 See Custody of a Minor (2), 392 Mass. 719, 467 N.E.2d 1286 (1984).
1" Id. at 720, 467 N.E.2d at 1287. When the child was two years old, the district attorney of
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born on April 11, 1978.' 64
 On January 22, 1980, the office of the district attorney of
Norfolk County filed a report which alleged that the child was abused and neglected.'65
The report charged that the mother, a battered wife, was an irresponsible parent and
indifferent to her daughter's needs. 166
The department filed a care and protection petition on March 19, 1980.' 67 The
mother agreed to grant temporary custody to the department and to have the child
placed with her grandmother. 166
 Shortly after the department filed its care and protection
petition, the father returned from Florida and moved in with the mother at a friend's
apartment.'" Soon afterwards, the grandmother broke her arm and returned the child
to her parentsi 79
 The department immediately took the child from her parents and
placed her in a foster home far from where her mother and grandmother lived. 17 ' This
placement made it difficult for the mother to visit the child. 12
On May 25, 1982, the lower court judge committed the child to the permanent
custody of the department and terminated the parents' visitation rights.'" In his findings,
the judge noted that the father had a long history of unemployment and alcoholism and
that the parents were frequently evicted from their apartments because of the father's
lack of employment.' 74
 The judge did note, however, that since the birth of her second
child the mother had exhibited positive parenting. skills. 176
 The judge adopted the
opinion of the psychologist who testified at trial that the child had become psychologically
bonded to her foster parents. 176
Norfolk County filed a report, pursuant to chapter 119, § 51A, which alleged abuse and neglect of
the child. Id. at 720-21, 467 N.E.2d at 1288. On March 19, 1980, the department filed a care and
protection petition, pursuant to chapter 119, § 24, in the Quincy District Court. Id. at 721, 467
N.E.2d at 1288. On July 17, 1981, the judge awarded permanent custody of the child to the
department. Id. at 722, 467 N.E.2d at 1288. On May 25, 1982, following a de novo trial, the judge
committed the child to the permanent custody of the department and terminated the parent's
visitation rights. Id. at 722, 467 N.E.2d at 1289. The mother appealed this decision to the appeals
court and obtained a stay to the order terminating visitation rights. Id. In December 1982, the
department moved to revoke the stay and, in January 1983, the judge allowed the motion and
terminated all parental visitation. Id. The appeals court affirmed in a summary order. See 17 Mass.
App. Ct. 1109, 459 N.E.2d 840 (1984). The Supreme Judicial Court granted the mother's application
for further appellate review. Custody of a Minor (2), 392 Mass. at 720, 467 N.E.2d at 1288.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 720-21, 467 N.E.2d at 1288.
166 Id. at 721, 467 N.E.2d at 1288. The department social worker who worked on the case filed
a report which stated that the mother and child had been living with the father in Florida until the
father had allegedly threatened the mother with a gun. Id. The social worker's report further
disclosed that the mother and child had subsequently returned to Massachusetts and moved in with











	 at 722, 467 N.E.2d at 1289.
"4 Id.
175 Id. at 723, 467 N.E.2d at 1289.
176 Id.
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Seven months later, in supplementary findings issued in conjunction with the trial
court's final order terminating visitation, the judge noted that the mother was living with
the child's father again.'" The judge ruled that the father, who had not appeared at all
in court during the prolonged hearings, was an improper person to have custody of the
child and that his influence on the mother contributed to her unfitness as a parent)"
The judge further observed that the child was suffering from the protracted custody
dispute and that the visits from her mother and grandmother contributed to her dis-
tress. 174
In reviewing the lower court's holding, the Supreme Judicial Court began with its
central premise for all child custody cases: parental unfitness must he persuasively shown
in order to justify state intervention in the parent-child relationship)" In this case, the
court held that the trial judge's decision to grant the care and protection petition was
not supported by a finding of parental unfitness)" In fact, the trial court judge had
found that the mother was exhibiting positive parenting skills at the time of triai. 182
Instead of focusing on parental unfitness, the order granting custody to the department,
the court found, appeared to be based entirely on a finding that the child had become
"psychologically bonded" to the foster parents)" The court noted that no "per se" rule
granting custody to prospective adoptive foster parents who had become the child's
psychological parents existed)" The court stated that judges were required to make
specific and detailed findings concerning parental fitness in custody proceedings and
that such findings, as in cases involving petitions to dispense with parental consent to
adoption, must be based on clear and convincing evidence. 185 In this case, the court
ruled that the lower court judge had failed to make specific and detailed findings
regarding the psychological effect of returning the child to her mother. 186 The Supreme
Judicial Court thus found that the lower court judge had "erroneously presumed that
he was restricted to considering only evidence related to the best interests of the child" 187




180 Id. at 724, 467 N.E.2d at 1289. "'Because the interest of the child is thought to be best
served in the stable, continuous environment of his own family . State intervention in the parent-
child relationship is justified only when parents appear unable to provide for their children's care
and protection. — Id. at 724, 467 N.E.2d at 1289-90 (citations omitted) (quoting Custody of a Minor
(1), 377 Mass. 876, 882, 389 N.E.2d 68, 73 (1979)).
18 ' 392 Mass. at 724, 467 N.E.2d at 1290.
' 8 ' Id.
'" Id.
1 " Id.
' 88 Id. at 725, 467 N.E.2d at 1290.
186 Id. The court observed that the trial judge's "wholesale adoption of the psychologist's
opinions and findings is entirely insufficient." Id.
187 Id. at 723, 467 N.E.2d at 1289. The court stated that "rather than focusing on parental
unfitness, the order granting permanent custody to the department appears to be based entirely
on the finding that the child had psychologically bonded to the foster parents." Id. at 724, 467
N.E.2d at 1290.
'" Id. at 723, 467 N.E.2d at 1289. The court continued, "in this case, the judgment allowing
the department's petition was not supported by a finding of parental unfitness." Id. at 724, 467
N.E.2d at 1290. The judgment was therefore vacated and the case remanded to the district court
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The court also considered the issue of visitation rights. When the department gains
custody of a child it has the power to control visits to that child.'" The court noted,
however, that this power was modified by chapter 119, section 35, which gives parents
the right to visit their children if "'the welfare of the child and the public interest will
not be injured.'' 190 The court held that the decision to terminate visitation rights was of
such significance to the parties that the same standard which applies in permanent
custody decisions should also apply in termination proceedings. 19 ' Thus, before visitation
rights can be terminated, judges must make specific findings demonstrating that parental
visits will harm the child or the public welfare. 192 In this case, the court ruled that such
findings were not present.' 9 ' The court stated that on a petition from the child's mother
the judge should reinstate her visitation rights unless the department could demonstrate
that such visitation would threaten the welfare of the child.'"
Moreover, the court, in accord with its use of the parental right doctrine and its
presumption that a child's interests are best served in his biological family, essentially
rejected the notion of psychological parenthood in disputes between a child's foster
parents and his natural parents. Under the court's present approach, if the natural
parents are found to be "fit," evidence that the child will be harmed by a separation
from long-time caretakers to whom the child has psychologically bonded will be ignored.
Further, the court set a high and difficult level of proof for the department if it wishes
to terminate visitation rights in a care and protection proceeding. 195
Thus, following the trend established in its decisions after Little Wanderers, the
Supreme Judicial Court continued to emphasize in 1984 that removal of a child from
the custody of his or her parents is justified only if there is clear and convincing evidence
that a parent is currently unfit to care for the child. 196
 The Supreme Judicial Court also
seemed to desire to shift power from the department's hands to the trial court's, both
in the disposition of children under a care and protection proceeding and in the deter-
mination of the subsequent visitation rights of the natural parents. 197 Furthermore, in
Custody of a Minor (2), the court noted that the concept of psychological bonding between
foster parents and a child in their care would be recognized only in rare circumstances. 198
for further proceedings. Id. at 727, 467 N.E.2d at 1291. On the same day as Care and Protection of
Three Minors and Custody of a Minor (2) were decided, the court also decided Petition of the
Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 467 N.E.2d
861 (1984). This decision added little new to what the court had already held that day. The court
held that the lower court judge had correctly decided that the mother was unfit to further the best
interests of the child. Id. at 700, 467 N.E.2d at 864. The court also held that the trial court, in
granting a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption, had the authority to allow for
post-adoption visitation by the natural family. Id. at 702, 467 N.E.2d at 866.
' 89 392 Mass. at 727, 467 N.E.2d at 1291.
198 Id. at 725-26, 467 N.E.2d at 1291 (quoting MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 35 (Michie/Law. Co-
op. 1975)).
191
 392 Mass. at 726, 467 N.E.2d at 1291.
192 Id.
' 98 Id.
' 94 Id. at 727, 467 N.E.2d at 1291.
As Id. at 726, 467 N.E.2d at 1291.
196 1d. at 724, 467 N.E:2d at 1289; Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 711-12, 467 N.E.2d at 857.
"7 Minor (2), 392 Mass. at 726, 467 N.E.2d at 1291.
798
 Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 716 n. I8, 467 N.E.2d at 860 n.18.
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These developments in the court's approach to child-custody disputes arose as a conse-
quence of the court's presumption that children's best interests in custody disputes are
served with their natural parents.
CRITIQUE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS STANDARD IN CHILD-CUSTODY CASES
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court now demands a finding of current
parental unfitness to justify state intervention in the parent-child relationship.'" Further,
in accord with the parental fitness test, the court has defined the best interests of the
child in terms of custody with his or her natural parents. 200 The court has applied the
parental fitness test in its "pure" form and has "cloaked" the test in the best interests
standard by establishing a presumption that custody of the child by its biological parent(s)
is in the best interests of the child. 20 ' Thus, in Massachusetts, the best interests of the
child standard is a factor in deciding child-custody cases in name only. 2°2 Unsurprisingly,
then, since 1979, 2°3 close and difficult decisions have been decided in favor of the
biological parents. 204 Hence, the court's use of the parental fitness standard has made
state intervention in the parent-child relationship more difficult.
The parental fitness approach to child-custody disputes, predominant in Massachu-
setts, runs counter to the approach adopted by most states. The majority of jurisdictions
in the country use the best interests standard in deciding whether to intervene in the
parent-child relationship. 205 This section will critique and evaluate the parental fitness
standard used by Massachusetts in determining whèther to intervene in the parent-child
relationship. The benefits of the best interests standard will be evaluated and the need
for recognizing the validity of psychological parents in child-custody disputes will be
assessed. Finally, as an alternative to Massachusetts' current standard in child-custody
cases, this note will propose that Massachusetts adopt the best interests standard and
recognize the effects of psychological bonding between foster parents and children in
their care.
1" See Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 711-12. 467 N.E.2d at 857; Minor (2), 392 Mass. at 724, 467
N.E.2d at 1289.
200 See Minor (2), 392 Mass. at 724, 467 N.E.2d at 1289-90. In Three Minors, the court remanded
the case because the lower court had ignored the child's "best interests" in making its dispositional
order. 392 Mass. at 713-14, 467 N.E.2d at 858-59.
2"' See Minor (2), 392 Mass. at 724, 467 N.E.2d at 1289-90; Minor (1), 377 Mass. at 882, 389
N.E.2d at 73. See also Note, supra note 13, at 154 n.18.
202 See Minor (1), 377 Mass. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73. See also Three Minors, 392 Mass. at 711-
12, 467 N.E.2d at 857.
2" In 1979, the court first established the parental fitness test as the critical element in child-
custody cases. See Minor (1), 377 Mass. at 882, 389 N.E.2d at 73.
2" See, e.g., Custody of a Minor (2), 392 Mass. 719, 467 N.E.2d 1286 (1984); Custody of a
Minor, 389 Mass. 755, 452 N.E.2d 483 (1983); Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to
Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 421 N.E.2d 28 (1981).
2°5 See, e.g., CAL. C1V. CODE 232.5 (West 1982) ("[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be
liberally construed to serve and protect the interests and welfare of the child"); COLO. REV. STAT.
19-3-109 (1978) ("the court shall hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition best
serving the interests of the child and the public"); Onio REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.38 (Supp. 1985)
("the court shall make disposition of the matter in whatever manner will serve the best interests of
the child"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. Lit. 10, § 29.1 (West Supp. 1985) ("at the hearing, the court may, if
it is in the best interests of the child ... "); VA. CODE § 16.1-279 (Supp. 1985) a child is found
to be ... neglected ... the juvenile court ... may make any of the following orders of disposition
to protect the welfare of the child"). See also Note, supra note 13, at 152.
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A. The Inadequacies of the Parental Right Doctrine
The parental fitness standard holds that biological parents are entitled to the custody
of their children unless they are affirmatively shown to be unfit. 208 The parental right
doctrine, whether stated in terms of parental fitness or cloaked as a presumption that a
child's interests are best served in his or her biological family, has often been justified
on principles of morality and natural affection. 207 The history of the doctrine, however,
reveals that it may have been created for considerations of economic expediency rather
than morality. 208 During the feudal period, custodial rights were subject to transfer and
sale.208 At that point, then, a custodial right was essentially a property right. 210 Eventually,
as concern developed for the welfare of the child, the emphasis shifted from the property
theory of custody to the personal status theory: biological parents, because the child was
born to them, were assumed to be the custodians best suited to serve the child's inter-
ests. 21 Even today, the state would prefer that biological parents shoulder the economic
burdens of raising a child. The state has a vested interest in maintaining the biological
parent-child relationship.
Legal and psychological commentators have attacked the parental right doctrine. 212
Professor Sanford Katz has stated that "lilt seems safe to say that when courts invoke
the parental right doctrine to award custody to the natural parents, they are merely
articulating an archaic notion, based upon a preference for the continuity of blood ties
or the preservation of kinship loyalty, in order to justify a decision. "212 While Professor
Katz does not dispute that biological parents have the greatest potentiality for carrying
on the healthiest parent-child relationship, he argues that that potentiality may never be
realized: "(o]thers may perform the task better. "2 4
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has never explicitly justified its pre-
sumption that even when the child has been separated from his biological parents and
206 See Katz, Foster Parents Versus Agencies: A Case Study in the Judicial Application of "The Best
Interests of the Child" Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 145, 151 (1966); Note, supra note 13, at 152-53.
2°7
 S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 4.
201 Id.
Allocation to parents of power and control over their children has its roots in our
society's culture; it may be based on social, psychological, and even financial consid-
erations. Quite simply, parents have traditionally reared their children in their home;
society believes it is healthy, for the most part for them to perform that function; and
it is economically expedient for the state that they do so.
Id. at 14.
2°9 Id. at 4.
21 °
211 Id,
212 See, e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
4 (1979); Katz, supra note 206, at 152; Note, supra note 13, at 156-58.
213 Katz, supra note 206, at 152. See also S. KArz, supra note I, at 52. Professor Katz does not
dispute the notion that children are "best" reared in their biological families. Id. at 52. He adds,
however, that:
(blest is here used synonymously with "ideally." Our culture considers the ideal parents
for a child to be his biological mother and father. They are the ones who have at least
the potentiality for carrying on the healthiest parent-child relationship. "Potentiality" is
an important qualification because some biological parents may in fact be entirely ill
equipped ... to continue a parental relationship without intervention.
Id. at 52-53 (emphasis in original).
214 Id. at 54.
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placed with foster parents for a long time, a child's interests are best served in his or
her biological family. One commentator has suggested that both this presumption and
the parental right doctrine are defensible only by the intuitive but incomplete psychological
generalization that a "blood-tie" between a biological parent and child will result even-
tually in "better" love for the child and hence, in the "best" psychological development
of that child. 215 The flaw in this generalization is that it completely overlooks the child's
present relationship to caretakers other than his natural parents, who may have assumed
the role of "parent" for the child. 2 t 6
Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit, in Beyond the Best Interests of the
Child, contend that birth is not the cause of children's attachment to their natural
parents. 2 L 7 Rather, they assert that it is the day-to-day interaction, companionship, and
shared experiences that lead to love, affection, and a basic trust between adult and
child. 216 The parent, they maintain, must provide day-to-day attention to the child's
needs for physical care, nourishment, comfort, affection, and stimulation. 212 Goldstein,
Freud and Solnit state that:
[O]nly a parent who provides for these needs will build a psychological
relationship to the child on the basis of the biological one and will become
his 'psychological parent' in whose care the child can feel valued and 'wanted.'
An absent biological parent will remain or tend to become, a stranger.220
While the biological parent starts with the greatest potentiality for becoming his or her
child's psychological parent, 22 ' this role can be fulfilled "either by a biological parent or
by any other caring adult — but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his biological
or legal relationship to the child may be." 222 Hence, from a psychological viewpoint, a
healthy parent-child relationship can be defined as a mutual interaction between adult
and child, biologically related or not, in which the adult provides the child with affection,
stimulation, and unbroken continuity of care. 223 It is this psychological relationship which
has been identified as critical to a child's successful personality development. 224 Thus,
the "right" to a child, which is normally secured over time by biological or adoptive
2° See Note, supra note 13, at 157-58.
" 'Id. See also J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOI,NIT, Supra note 212, at 4. Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit maintain that while the law has traditionally been protective of a child's physical well-being
it has been slow to understand and acknowledge the necessity of safeguarding the child's psycho-
logical well-being:
While [decisionmakers in law] make the interests of a child paramount over all other
claims when his physical well-being is in jeopardy, they subordinate, often intentionally,
his psychological well-being to, for example, an adult's right to assert a biological
Yet both well-beings are equally important, and any sharp distinction between them
is artificial.
Id.
217 id. at 17.
218 Id. at 19.
So Id. at 17.
220 Id.
22 ' S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 54 .
222 j GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 19.
222 S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 53.
224 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 17-28; S. KATZ, supra note 1,
at 52-55; Note, supra note 13, at 160-61.
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parents, may be lost by their failure to provide continuous care for their child and earned
by those who do provide for the child's needs. 225
According to Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, because continuity of relationships, sur-
roundings, and environmental influences are essential for a child's normal development,
the goal of child placement should be permanence and stability. 226
 They contend that
when a foster parent or other adult has assumed the position of psychological parent to
a child, this psychological parent-child relationship should not be disrupted. 227 The new
parent-child relationship, which develops in the absence of the biological parents, has
been compared to a successful adoption, although it is not recognized as such in law. 228
When a child who has formed a psychological bond with an adult other than his biological
parents is returned to his biological parents, the child's separation from the psychological
parent can be equated psychologically to the orphaning of that child. 229 .Because of the
importance of psychological parent-child relationships, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit ar-
gue that the law should accord psychological parenthood the same protection it affords
the natural parent-child relationship. The psychological parent should be treated in law
as if he or she were the biological parent. 23°
A number of commentators, recognizing the validity of psychological parenthood,
have stated that psychological foster parents should be allowed to adopt children in their
care after a fixed period of years of separation from the child's biological parents."' A -
child's sense of time has a bearing on his or her need for continuity. 232 Younger children
have less ability to withstand successfully separations from their parents. 233 For most
children under five years old, the "temporary" absence of parental figures for greater
than two months is an incomprehensible event which is experienced as a permanent loss
accompanied by feelings of helplessness and extreme deprivation. 234
 Therefore, Gold-
stein, Freud and Solnit argue that the courts can best promote the psychological well-
being of the children in custody disputes by "quickly" recognizing prospective adoptive
foster parents who have become a child's psychological parents as his parents in law. 235
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in accord with its use of the parental
right doctrine, has been very reluctant to recognize psychological parents' rights. The
225 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 39.
225 Id. at 35.
227 1d. at 39. See also S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 104; Note, supra note 13, at 158-59; Note, Child
Custody — Rebutting the Presumption of Parental Preference, 43 Miss. L.J. 247, 253 (1972).
228 See 1 GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 27.
229 Note, supra note 13, at 161. Goldstein, Freud and Solnit state that "[s]uch reactions do not
differ from those caused by separation from, or death of, natural parents." J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD
& A. Sousa', supra note 212, at 27.
23° Got,risTcm, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 39. See Note, supra note 13, at 159.
25 ' See e.g., J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SO LN IT, BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
42, 46; Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of Neglected Children, 28 STAN. L. REV. 625, 696 (1976);
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication, 39 Law & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 280 (1975).
2" See J. Gok.oFrEm, A. FREUD & A, Sot.NtT, supra note 231.
2" Id. at 45.
"4 1 GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 41.
2" Id. at 42. In BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD, Goldstein, Freud & Solnit propose
the following "time limits" beyond which it is unreasonable to assume that the child's residual ties
to his natural parents are more significant than those which have developed between the child and
his psychological foster parents; (a) one year for a child up to the age of three years at the time of
placement; and (b) two years for a child from the age of three at the time of placement. J. GOLDSTEIN,
A. FREUD & A. Sot,Nrr, supra note 231, at 46.
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court has explicitly rejected the large body of legal and psychological commentary which
urges fixed time periods in granting permanent custody to caretakers who have become
a child's psychological parents. 236 Further, in 1983, the court ruled that the statutory
presumption that a child's interests are best served by termination of parental rights
when the child has been in foster care for more than one year,237 was unconstitutional
as a violation of the natural parents' due process rights. 238
 Contrary to the legislative
intent evidenced in chapter 210, section 3(c), the court has stated that it will grant
custody to prospective adoptive psychological foster parents only in rare circumstances. 239
The court has contended, without any psychological basis, that "Woo often the claim
that bonding justifies adoption is the result of a self-fulfilling prophecy." 2"
The court's use of the parental fitness doctrine often places children with their
natural parents even when those parents are unable to further the best interests of their
children. As long as the court determines the biological parents to be "fit," it will ignore
the devastating psychological effects of disturbing a parent-child relationship and, even
after a number of years with foster parents, return the child to its natural parents."'
This result fails to take into account the child's present relationship with his psychological
parents and presumes, contrary to psychological studies, that the child's interests are
always best served in his biological family.242
The court's adherence to the parental right doctrine has, therefore, significant
negative consequences for the children of Massachusetts. Under this doctrine, the psy-
chological well-being of Massachusetts' children is often ignored on the basis of an archaic
generalization that the biological family is presumed to be the only family unit in which
a child can prosper. There appears to be no reasonable explanation for the court's
rejection of the considerable legal and psychological commentary which has recognized
the critical importance of a child's psychological parents. The court's failure to recognize
the importance of psychological parents has often led to unstable placements with many
"parental" figures. Under such conditions, children cannot prosper.
236
	 e.g., Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense with Consent to Adoption,
383 Mass. 573, 591 n,16, 421 N.E.2d 28, 38 n.16 (1981).
We emphasize that we do not recognize a per se rule that prospective adoptive foster
parents, who have become a minor child's psychological parents, should automatically
prevail in a custody dispute over a natural parent. We are not unaware of a significant
body of legal commentary that urges such an approach.
Id.
"7 MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, 3(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981) provides in pertinent part that
"[i]f said child has been in the care of the department for more than one year ... there shall be a
presumption that the best interests of the child will be served by granting a petition for adoption
... or by issuing a decree dispensing with the need for consent."
2" See Petition of the Department of Social Services to Dispense With Adoption, 389 Mass. 793,
802-03, 452 N.E.2d 497, 503 (1983). The Supreme Judicial Court noted that termination of parental
rights under Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982), requires clear and convincing evidence. 389
Mass. at 802, 452 N.E.2d at 503. The court ruled that the presumption of ch. 210, § 3(c) was
unconstitutional because it shifted the burden of proof to the natural parents, thereby violating
their due process rights under Santosky. Id. at 802-03, 452 N.E.2d at 503.
535
 Care and Protection of Three Minors, 392 Mass. 704, 716 n.18, 467 N.E.2d 851, 860 n.18
(1984).
24' Id.
24 See, e.g., id.; Custody of a Minor (2), 392 Mass. 719, 724, 467 N.E.2d 1286, 1289-90 (1984);
Petition of the Department of Social Services to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 391 Mass. 113,
118-19, 461 N.E.2d 186, 190 (1984); Petition of the Department of Public Welfare to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption, 383 Mass. 573, 591 n.16, 421 N.E.2d 28, 38 n.16 (1981).
242 See Note, supra note 13, at 158-59.
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B. The Best Interests Standard
The approach of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which is based on the
primacy of parental rights, appears to violate the spirit of the parens patriae doctrine.
Sanford Katz has stated that ItTheoretically, the court's role in child custody cases is that
of parens patriae. As such, the court has a responsibility ... to determine the best interests
of the child." 243 The interests of the child, and hence his or her need for a psychological
parent, should be the paramount consideration of Massachusetts' courts in deciding
custody disputes. The choice between the possibility of inflicting harm upon an adult or
upon a developing, helpless child seems a clear one."' The child should not be made to
suffer the consequences of his biological parents' inadequacies. 245 Goldstein, Freud and
Solnit point out that their value preference for making the child's needs paramount,
and thereby affording the child the utmost protection from physical and emotional
abuse, is in more than just the child's best interests. According to these commentators,
"[t]his value preference ... is in society's best interests. Each time the cycle of grossly
inadequate parent-child relationships is broken society stands to gain a person capable
of becoming an adequate parent for children of the future." 2 4 6 By adopting a standard
which focuses first and foremost on the needs of the child, the law may serve to help
both present and future generations of children. 247 Hence, in order to promote the
interests of society in general, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit have stated that "a child's
placement should rest entirely on consideration for the child's own inner situation and
developmental needs.'' 248
While advocates of psychological parenthood believe that the welfare of the child
should be the primary consideration of the courts, they have differed as to the appro-
priate standard to achieve this result. The best interests standard has, for example, been
criticized as being too broad and vague and thereby allowing trial judges too much
discretion. 249 Both Professors Mnookin and Wald maintain that the best interests stan-
dard allows the state to intrude too easily into the parent-child relationship. 25° Both
commentators premise their rejection of the best interests standard on their preference
for family autonomy. 25 ' They maintain that because judges are unable to predict accu-
rately what is truly in a child's best interests, the best interests standard allows trial judges
too much latitude. 252 Wald has stated that, without legislative definition, decisions made
249
	 KA'rz, supra note I, at 104.
244 See Note, supra note 13, at 156.
2" Waid, supra note 231, at 638.
246 1 GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOI.NIT, supra note 212, at 7. Many people demonstrate the
same inadequacies as their parents exhibited. Wald, supra note 231, at 638. For example, many
abused children later abuse their children. Id. at 639 (citing D. Gil, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN
18-48 (1973)).
247 Wald, supra note 231, at 639.
24 ' J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 106.
249 See Mnookin, supra note 231, at 230; Wald, supra note 231, at 650.
250 Mnookin, supra note 231, at 277; Wald, supra note 231, at 650.
2s'
	 supra note 231, at 266; Wald, supra note 231, at 638.
252 Mnookin, supra note 231, at 258-61; Wald, supra note 231, at 650. Mnookin states that
Where are numerous competing theories of human behavior, based on radically dif-
ferent conceptions of the nature of man, and no consensus exists that any one is
correct. No theory at all is considered widely capable of generating reliable predictions
about the psychological and behavioral consequences of alternative dispositions for a
particular child.
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under the best interests standard "merely reflect a judge's own 'folk psychology. -253 As
a result, Mnookin and Wald contend that the courts should reject the best interests
standard and intervene in the parent-child relationship only when the child's health is
substantially or seriously threatened. 254
Professor Katz, on the other hand, has pointed out the value of broad neglect
statutes utilizing the best interests standard. He maintains that the rationale for allowing
trial judges wide discretion in making custody decisions is that local judges presumably
have the best knowledge of the community resources available to them. 255 Further,
according to Katz, juvenile and domestic judges are considered "closer" to the issues
involved and are thought to reflect community values. 256 Katz asserts that broad neglect
statutes also allow for a wide degree of variance in child-rearing. Because there is no
exact or perfect formula for raising children, Katz states that the law must allow, to a
certain extent, for differences in style in parental behavior toward their children. 257
Moreover, Katz observes that broad neglect statutes recognize that neglectful behavior
can and does vary widely from case to case. 25s Thus, a broad neglect standard allows
judges to examine each case on its facts and, according to Katz, therefore eliminates the
need to search for specific behavior upon which to "peg" the neglect charge.mg
Professor Katz has recognized, however, that while the breadth of neglect statutes
enhances trial court judges' discretion, it may also provide these judges with the oppor-
tunity to impose their own child-rearing preferences on the parents before them. 26° But,
unlike Mnookin and Wald, who have rejected the best interests standard for its grant of
wide discretion to trial court judges, Katz suggests that the possible abuse of trial court
discretion can be curtailed by placing guidelines on the standard. 26 ' Katz contends that
"best interests" should include "a constellation of social values essential to a child's
development into a physically and emotionally healthy and responsible adult." 262 Katz
Mnookin, supra note 231, at 258. In a sense, Mnookin and Wald argue that because psychological
theory cannot predict the future course of the child's life it should be ignored. Goldstein, Freud &
Solnit contend, however, that psychological theory can be utilized, in the short run, to minimize
harm to the child. For a discussion of their theory, see infra notes 266-80 and accompanying text.
2" Wald, supra note 231, at 650.
2" See Mnookin, supra note 231, at 278; Wald, supra note 231, at 642. Mnookin's proposed
standard for removal provides in relevant part that
[a] state may remove a child from parental custody without parental consent only if
the state first proves: (a) there is an immediate and substantial danger to the child's
health; and (b) there are no reasonable means acceptable to the parents by which the
state can protect the child's health without removing the child from parental custody.
Mnookin, supra note 231, at 278. Wald proposes that "state intervention be limited to instances
where a child has suffered serious physical harm, serious and narrowly defined emotional damage
or sexual abuse, or where there is a substantial likelihood that the child imminently will suffer
serious physical harm." Wald, supra note 231, at 642.
255 S. KATZ., supra note 1, at 62.
256 Id. at 63.
257 Id. at 64.
259 Id.
259 Id. at 64-65.
269 Id, at 65.
26 ' Katz, supra note 206, at 168. These value judgments also may go unchecked because of the
lack of a written opinion and because few child-custody cases are appealed. S. KATZ, .supra note 1,
at 65.
262 Id. at 145.
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asserts, in accord with a child's need for continuity and emotional stability, that the
primary responsibility facing the courts should be to decide what custodial disposition
will provide the child with a stable and secure parent-child relationship. 263 He suggests
a number of specific goals that a disposition should seek to provide the child: (I) physical
and emotional health; (2) an economic base from which the child can grow into a
contributing member of society; (3) the development of skills and the fulfillment of his
or her intellectual potential; and (4) the development of equal respect for all human
beings and the child's maturation into a responsible aclult. 264 The fundamental under-
lying notion of these criteria, Katz maintains, is "that a child's healthy development is
ultimately a question of emotional stability, promoted by a relationship of affection,
stimulation and unbroken continuity of care." 269 Consequently, Katz defines the best
interests standard in terms of certain social values which will promote both the physical
and psychological health of the child.
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, while agreeing with Professor Katz that the interests
of the child should be the paramount consideration of the courts, have suggested a
standard which they call the "least detrimental alternative." 266 In answer to Mnookin and
Wald's criticism that psychological theory is too confused to predict which disposition
will lead to a child's healthiest development, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit contend that
placement decisions can be based on certain generally applicable and useful predic-
tions.267 It can be predicted, they assert, that, given a child's sense of time and his need
for continuity in personal relationships, 268 adults who are a child's psychological parents
are best suited to raise that child. 269 Goldstein, Freud and Solnit contend that while no
one can truly predict the future course of another's life, the law can act, in the short
run, to minimize harm to the child and to safeguard the child's growth and develop-
ment. 2"
The least detrimental alternative, as defined by Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, is that
placement
which maximizes, in accord with the child's sense of time and on the basis
of short-term predictions given the limitations of knowledge, his or her
opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous basis a
relationship with at least one adult who is or will become his psychological
parent. 27 '
While Goldstein, Freud and Solnit agree with the manifest purpose of the best interests
standard, they contend that the least detrimental alternative standard is preferable
261 Id. at 146.
261
265 Id. Anna Freud, a well known child development psychologist, states that:
"The best interests of a child are served, according to our point of view, by all measures
which promote his smooth progression toward normal maturity. The latter, in its turn,
depends above all . . . on the free interchange of affection between child and adult;
on ample external stimulation of the child's inborn, internal potentialities; and on
unbroken continuity of care."
Id. at 82 n.3 (quoting A. Fitalo, 5 THE WRITINGS OF ANNA FREUD: 1956-1965 469 (1969)).
266 j GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 53.
262 Id. at 51.
269
	 id. at 53.
269 Id.
270 1d. at 51, 53.
Id. at 53.
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because it conveys to judges that the child's psychological development is at risk and that
speedy action is necessary to avoid further damage. 272 Moreover, these authors contend
that the best interests standard has often been construed by courts and legislatures in a
way which has not truly promoted children's best interests. 275 The use of the least
detrimental alternative standard, they assert, would serve to remind judges and social
welfare agencies that their task is to salvage an unsatisfactory situation by weighing the
advantages and disadvantages of actual options. 274 Hence, the standard proposed by
Goldstein, Freud and Solnit is phrased in terms of minimizing harm to a child in a
custody dispute rather than maximizing the child's best interests. 275 By essentially re-
phrasing the best interests standard in a negative way, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit hope
to force the courts to make the child's interests paramount and to strive for realistic
predictions of what disposition will best serve the child's interests. 278
Finally, Professor Katz and Goldstein, Freud and Solnit advocate family autonomy. 277
Contrary to what Mnookin and Wald suggest, these commentators contend that a stan-
dard which makes children's rights the paramount consideration of the courts need not
violate basic societal notions of familial privacy and autonomy. 278
 Importantly, however,
their preference for minimal state intrusion is defined in terms of psychological parent-
child relationships: a case, for example, involving a child in the longtime care of
persons who are not his legal parents, it is the intrusion upon that relationship which
must be minimized."279 Thus, these commentators maintain that the goal of minimum
coercive intervention by the state always applies to a child's de facto, ongoing parents,
who may or may not be his lawful parents at the time intervention is contemplated. 28°
In other words, Katz, and Goldstein, Freud and Solnit, in accord with children's critical
need for continuity and emotional stability, recognize the need to protect psychological
parent-child relationships, whether or not they are also biological parent-child relation-
ships.
Hence, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's use of the parental right doc-
trine, coupled with its rejection of the validity of psychological parenthood, has often
led to child-custody dispositions which are in the child's best interests "in-name-only. "281
The statutory presumption that adoption is in a child's best interests after more than
272 Id. at 54.
273 Id. Goldstein, Freud & Solnit contend that many decisions made under the best interests
standard are "in-name-only" for the best interests of the child being placed. Id. The criticism
certainly seems applicable to many of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's decisions. See
infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
274 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 212, at 63.
275 Id.
278 Id. at 53. When a child is removed from his or her natural parents, in some ways the child's
"best" or ideal interests are no longer completely attainable. Thus, Goldstein, Freud and Solnit
contend that when this happens judges should not become "enmeshed in the hope and magic
associated with 'best,— but instead should seek to minimize any further disruptions in the child's
life. Id. at 63, 99; S. KA-rz, supra note 1, at 146.
277
	 J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 231, at 28-29; S. KATZ, supra note 1,
at 145-46.
278 See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 231, at 28-29; S. KATZ, supra note 1,
at 145-46.
2" J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, supra note 231, at 28-29.
2" See id.; S. KATZ, supra note 1, at 145-46.
281 See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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one year in foster care seems to have been intended to prevent the disruptive situation
whereby a child who has psychologically bonded with his foster parents is returned to
natural parents who have become strangers to the child. 282 Returning children who have
bonded to their foster parents to their natural parents ignores a child's critical need for
emotional stability and continuity and has a devastating impact on the child's develop-
ment.28'
To prevent, or at least to minimize the developmental harm that neglected children
inevitably incur, Massachusetts must, therefore, make the child's interests the paramount
consideration of its courts. The child's best interests should be broadly defined by the
legislature to promote the child's physical and psychological health and to minimize
disruption to the child's development. The critical importance of psychological bonding
to foster parents should be recognized and these "new" families should be accorded the
same familial autonomy Massachusetts accords the biological family.
The Supreme Judicial Court's rejection of the statutory presumption in favor of
adoption after the child has been in foster care for more than one year is inconsistent
with the maximization of neglected children's welfare advocated by Goldstein, Freud,
Solnit and Katz. The court's rejection of the presumption is, however, consistent with its
adherence to the parental right doctrine. The court's position is in the minority in the
United States. Not suprisingly, therefore, other states, consistent with the best interests
standard, have enacted child-custody statutes which are premised on the recognition of
psychological parenthood and correspondingly accord psychological parent-child rela-
tionships the same familial autonomy the state accords the original biological family.
IV. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM AND AN ILLUSTRATION OF ITS SUCCESS IN CALIFORNIA
Prior to 1969, California had been, as Massachusetts is now, a stronghold of the
parental right doctrine.284 Moreover, the California courts were extremely reluctant to
label any parent "unfit," and thus awarded custody of children to their biological parents,
even after long periods of separation from them. 285 Increasing dissatisfaction with this
situation, however, led to the enactment of Civil Code section 4600286 as part of the
California Family Law Act of 1969. 287 Section 4600, with its emphasis on the welfare of
the child, marked the beginning of the decline of the parental fitness doctrine in Cali-
fornia. 288
The California approach to child-custody disputes, sixteen years after the passage
of the Family Law Act of 1969, has made the best interests of the child the primary
consideration of the courts of California. The notion of psychological parenthood is
282 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, 3(c) (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981).
285 See supra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
284 Bodenheimer, New Trends and Requirements in Adoption Law and Proposals for Legislative Change,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 10, 21 (1975).
285 Id. at 19, 23.
2&6
	
Civ. CODE § 4600 (West 1983) provides in pertinent part that
[blefore the court makes any order awarding custody to a person or persons other
than a parent, without the consent of the parents, it shall make a finding that an award
of custody to a parent would be detrimental to the child and the award to a nonparent
is required to serve the best interests of the child.
CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600(c) (West 1983).
287 Bodenheimer, supra note 284, at 24.
288 Id. at 24-28.
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recognized, and fixed time limits are statutorily set within which the natural parents,
with the Department of Welfare's help, must "rehabilitate" themselves or risk losing
their child to adoption. The California approach, therefore, represents a model, modern
approach to child custody whose twin goals are permanency and emotional stability for
the child. While natural parents are given every opportunity to keep their children, the
ultimate best interests of the child, as embodied in Goldstein, Freud and Solnit's least
detrimental alternative standard, is the basic guideline by which California's courts decide
child-custody cases.
Massachusetts' legislature should follow the lead of California's legislature. The best
interests of the child should be statutorily mandated as the primary consideration of the
courts in deciding child-custody cases. Further, when possible, the child's wishes should
be consulted. The natural parents' right to raise their own children should be given
some weight, but the ultimate best interests of the child should be the critical factor in
deciding child-custody cases.
Foster care should be defined by the Massachusetts legislature as a temporary
solution to the problem of inadequate parenting. While the Supreme Judicial Court has
ruled that a statutory presumption that foster parents he allowed to adopt children who
have been in their care more than one year is unconstitutional, other state courts appear
to have found that such statutes are constitutional. 289 The legislature should force the
court to reconsider its position on fixed time limits for the adoption of foster children
by their foster parents. After a care and protection petition has been granted, parents
should have a fixed number of years within which to regain custody of their children.
If the parents fail to "rehabilitate" themselves, the Department of Social Services should
institute a petition to dispense with parental consent to adoption.
Even if the Supreme Judicial Court refuses to accept a per se rule for the adoption
of foster children, the ultimate goal of the system should be to provide neglected children
with a permanent, secure, and stable environment in which to grow. The court presumes
that the natural parents are the only ones capable of providing such an environment.
Massachusetts' legislature must make clear to the court that if the natural parents are
unable to provide the child with adequate parenting the state must place the child with
adoptive parents who can adequately care for the child. The assumption that a child's
needs are best served with his natural parents must not be allowed to override the state's
primary consideration in child-custody cases — the welfare and best interests of the
child. To achieve permanence and emotional stability for Massachusetts' neglected chil-
dren, the legislature must formally recognize the validity of psychological bonding to
foster parents and must act to protect psychological parent-child relationships which
form with long-time caretakers other than natural parents. Children who have psycho-
logically bonded to their foster parents should not be returned to marginal natural
parents who are strangers to their children. This unhappy result can no longer be
justified by such ancient notions as the blood tie or a presumption that it is always in a
child's best interests to be with his or her natural parents.
Massachusetts' legislature has a duty, as parens patriae, to ensure that the children of
its state receive adequate parenting. The court, left by the legislature to its own devices
in this area, has formulated a standard which focuses on the rights of natural parents
rather than on the best interests of the child. The court, by using a parental fitness
"' For an example of such a state, see infra notes 291-315 and accompanying text.
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standard, is breaching its parens patriae duty. The legislature must remind the court of
its own words that in child-custody cases "the first and paramount duty of the courts is
to consult the welfare of the child ... Rio that governing principle every other public
and private consideration must yield." 290
California mandates by statute that its courts consider primarily the best interests
of the child in neglect proceedings. Section 4600 of the Civil Code focuses on the interests
of the child and requires a finding of detriment to the child for removal "[i]n any
proceeding where there is at issue the custody of a minor child."29 ' In California, an
award of custody to a nonparent is required if it serves the best interests of the neglected
child and the court finds that an award of custody to the natural parents would be
detrimental to the child. 292 Hence, California has responded to the legal and psycholog-
ical commentators who have urged that the child's best interests should be the decisive
factor in child-custody adjudication. In contrast to Massachusetts, child-custody law in
California has evolved as the state of psychological knowledge concerning child devel-
opment has become more certain.
Termination of parental rights without the consent of the natural parents is also
governed by the best interests standard in California. Section 232(h) provides that lait
all termination proceedings, the court shall consider the wishes of the child and shall act
in the best interests of the child." 295 Section 232.5, amended in 1983, also provides that
the courts "shall act in the best interests of the child" in all termination proceedings. 294
Thus, not only are California courts required to consider the best interests of the child
in termination proceedings, but they are also required to consult the wishes of the child
in deciding whether to terminate parental rights.
Section 232(a)(7) of the California Civil Code provides that if the parents' incapacity
or unwillingness to provide care or control continues for longer than one year an action
may be brought to terminate parental rights. 295 This provision enables the court to
remove the child from foster care and place him or her in a permanent familial situation.
California's child-custody statutes recognize that foster care is only a temporary solution
to the problem of inadequate parenting and that the ultimate best interests of the child
calls for permanence and stability, either with his natural parents or with foster parents
to whom the child has psychologically bonded.296 California Welfare and Institutional
Code section 306 provides in pertinent part that
[i]t is the policy of the legislature that foster care should be a temporary
method of care for the children of this state, that children have a right to a
normal life, that reunification with the natural parent or parents or another
alternate permanent living situation such as adoption or guardianship are
more suitable to a child's well-being than is foster care ... and that, to the
290 Richards v. Forrest, 278 Mass. 547, 553, 180 N.E. 508, 511 (1932).
29 ' See CAL. C1V. CODE § 4600(a) (West 1983),
292 1d. § 4600(c).
29' See id. §.232(b) (West 1982).
294 See id. § 232.5. Section 232.5 provides in relevant part that:
[t]he provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to serve and protect the
interests and welfare of the child. At all proceedings to declare a child free from
parental custody and control, the court shall consider the wishes of the child, bearing
in mind the age of the child, and shall act in the best interests of the child.
295 See id. § 232(a)(7).
296
 See CAI.. Wta.r. & INST. CODE § 396 (West 1984).
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extent possible, the current practice of moving children receiving foster care
services from one foster home to another ... should be discontinued. 297
Hence, after dependency proceedings have been instituted and the child removed from
the parents' custody, the natural parents have one year to "rehabilitate" themselves.
During this year, the Department of Welfare is required to offer reasonable rehabilitative
services to the parents. 298 If, after one year, the court determines that return of the child
to the natural parents would be detrimental to the welfare of the child, then termination
proceedings will be instituted. 296
The purpose of the termination statute is then to "serve the welfare and best interests
of a child by providing the stability and security of an adoptive home." 300 While the
statute recognizes the importance of the natural family, it also recognizes the detrimental
effect that multiple placements have on the well-being of the child. If the natural parents
cannot prove to the court within one year that they are able to provide and care for the
child, the court will attempt to place the child in an adoptive situation. 30 '
The California courts have followed the strong mandates of California's child-
custody statutes. in In re Laura F., 902 for example, the California Supreme Court consid-
ered a termination proceeding under California Civil Code section 232(a)(7). 503 The
court, quoting In re Eugene W., stated that "'it seems indisputable that ... the state as a
parens patriae not only has a compelling interest but also a duly to sever the parental
bonds once a situation contemplated by the statute arises.'" 304 In Laura F., the mother,
after more than one year, was still unable to provide a proper home for her children. 3°s
The court determined that return of the children to her would be detrimental to the
children's welfare. 306 The court therefore held that there was "substantial evidence that
termination is in the best interests of the children." 307
Likewise, the California Supreme Court, in In re Angelia p.,308 while noting the need
to balance the interests of the child with those of the parents in maintaining the natural
family, also observed that the legislature had clearly manifested its desire that all ter-
mination statutes `"be liberally construed to preserve and protect the interests and welfare
of the child. -309 The court stated that "[On theory" the parental preference and best
interests of the child standards need not necessarily conflict. 310 When they do conflict,
however, the court maintained that the legal system should protect the child's interests. 3 "
In the case before it, the court noted that the child in question had been in foster care
for four years and that "return of the child to her parents would be detrimental to the
595 Id.
298 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West 1982).
269 See id.
3°6 See id. 232.6.
301 See id. 232(a)(7).
3°2 33 Cal. 3d 826, 662 P.2d 922, 191 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1983).
303 1d. at 829, 662 P.2d at 923, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 465.
304 Id, at 837, 662 P.2d at 930, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 471 (emphasis added).
505 M. at 835, 662 P.2d at 928, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
5°6 Id.
Id. at 836, 662 P.2d at 928, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 470.
308 28 Cal. 3d 908, 916, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
59' Id. at 916, 623 P.2d at 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
310
311 Id. at 917, 623 P.2d at 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
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child's welfare. 3" Rejecting the parents' request for further delay before termination of
their parental rights, 3 " the court found that "[sluch uncertainty conflicts with the intent
of section 232 to afford children during their formative years a permanent, secure, and
stable environment."'" The court therefore held that the trial court had correctly ter-
minated the parental rights of the natural parents.'"
The Massachusetts legislature should enact a child-custody statute similar to that
now used by California. Under this statute, a neglected child's best interests and welfare
would be the primary consideration of the courts in determining whether the state
should intervene in the parent-child relationship. The legislature should not ignore
parental rights, but these rights should be subordinate to the child's right to a permanent,
secure, and stable environment. While parents should be given every opportunity to
keep custody of their children, the legislature must recognize that when parents fail to
provide proper parenting for their children the state has a duty to intervene as parens
patriae to further the ultimate best interests of the child. Thus, when the natural parents
fail to "rehabilitate" themselves within one year, this intervention should take the form
of a termination of their parental rights. The legislature should make clear, however,
that termination is not to be followed by long-term foster care. Once parental rights
have been severed, the legislature should mandate that every effort be made to see that
the child is adopted and that he or she is afforded a permanent, stable environment in
which to grow.
CONCLUSION
Massachusetts, in contrast to the majority of jurisdictions, essentially uses the paren-
tal fitness test to determine whether state intervention in the parent-child relationship is
justified. To remove a child from his or her parents, the Supreme Judicial Court requires
a current finding of parental unfitness. Moreover, the court presumes that a child's best
interests are served with his or her natural family. In accord with this presumption, the
court recognizes the notion of psychological bonding between foster parents and children
in their care in rare circumstances only. The court's use of the parental fitness test has
made state intervention in the parent-child relationship difficult. Since the court's deci-
sion in Little Wanderers, close decisions have been decided consistently in favor of the
biological parents. In some instances, these decisions have produced harsh results. In
some cases, children who have been with foster parents all of their lives have been
returned to natural parents who are strangers to these children. Children cannot prosper
in this type of unstable environment. Thus, the Supreme Judicial Court, by making
parental rights the primary concern of Massachusetts' courts in child-custody cases, has
breached the state's duty as parens patriae to protect the welfare of the children of
Massachusetts.
The Massachusetts legislature therefore must make clear that the paramount con-
sideration of the courts in child-custody cases is the child's best interests and welfare.
The primary goal of child custody should be to place the child in a permanent, secure
312 Id. at 923, 925, 623 P.2d at 206, 208, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 646, 647.
3 ' 3 Id. at 923, 623 P.2d at 206, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 646. The parents requested a delay "until some
uncertain future date when, if all went well, Angelia could be returned to them." Id.
514 Id.
115 /d. at 927, 623 P.2d at 208, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 648.
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and stable environment. When parents fail to provide adequate parenting for their
children, the state, as parens patriae, must intervene to protect the child's welfare. While
natural parents should be strongly encouraged to regain their children, when they fail
to "rehabilitate" themselves within a certain time, parental rights should be terminated
and every effort should be made to have the child adopted. In this type of framework,
where a child's best interests are paramount over the rights of natural parents, neglected
children have the best chance to develop normally and lead psychologically healthy
childhoods.
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